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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis addresses how the development of the Hubble Space Telescope and the reaction to its 
initial mirror flaw illustrates the systemic issues affecting large-scale science in the U.S. civil 
space program. The socio-economic and political legacy of the prestige-driven space race in the 
1960’s impacted the development of programs such as the Space Shuttle and Hubble in a way 
which both allowed them to be possible and curtailed their ability to succeed. The reaction to the 
Hubble flaw and other problems in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, as seen through newspaper 
articles and congressional hearings, illuminates the complexity of Big Science programs and the 
extent to which they are affected by factors other than science. Actor-Network theory is used in 
part as a framework to address the power of different technological, human, and bureaucratic 
entities within the vast developmental and technical structures of Big Science programs. This 
thesis argues that the misrepresentation and oversimplification of scientific and technological 
entities as a symptom of large-scale technological development during the Cold War has had a 
significant impact on the contemporary structure of aerospace and astrophysical sciences in the 
United States.  
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Introduction 
“For most science news to get printed these days it has to involve big bang, big bucks, big screw-
up, or big comeback—and with Hubble you’ve got them all.”1 A writer for the New York Times 
described the highly publicized and volatile position of the Hubble Space Telescope’s launch and 
subsequent issues which took place in the early 1990’s. “Big science” is generally defined as 
post-WWII scientific programs which require generous amounts of funding and are developed 
with the resources and expertise of many different agencies, groups, institutions, and 
governments. As one of NASA’s first “big science” programs which was developed without an 
overt military pretext, the perceived success or failure of Hubble was used as a way to validate or 
undermine the competency of NASA and the necessity of space science. Hubble came to fruition 
after the Cold War had technically ended, however the infrastructure of its development was 
rooted in military, political, and economic trends which characterized the early space race. 
Although Hubble has become a success story for NASA, the history of its development 
illuminates the growing technical and political complexities of big science projects as well as the 
civil space program’s inability to extricate itself from its Cold War past. The problems 
experienced by Hubble in the early 1990’s manifested from prolonged systemic issues in the 
space program and demonstrated the vulnerability of big science to technical failure, budgetary 
restraints, management issues, and intense public critique. The political and popular reactions to 
the initial Hubble flaw exposed the precarious position of NASA science programs and the 
overall vulnerability of big science and the American space program in the post-Cold War era.  
It is useful to address the variety of socio-cultural forces which influence technological 
events and trends, however the impact and power of technological and scientific entities alone is 
                                                          
1 Eric J. Chaisson, The Hubble Wars: Astrophysics Meets Astropolitics in the Two-Billion Dollar Struggle over the 
Hubble Space Telescope (New York, N.Y.: Harper Collins, 1994), 367. 
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not often considered in a significant way. This thesis attempts to address the economic and socio-
political historical trends which have cumulated in the Hubble Space Telescope and the current 
space program in the context of changing perceptions of science as well as acknowledging the 
role of technology as a significant independent force in the networks which compose large 
scientific programs. Actor-Network theory provides a framework to consider technological 
entities such as Hubble as agents within the contexts of the massive networks of people, 
agencies, institutions, and other participants which facilitate and allow technological objects to 
exist. The actor-network model allows technological trends to be addressed more 
comprehensively as part of a multivariate fluctuating system and without reducing technological 
objects to the social meanings which are applied to them. Technological objects often come to be 
broadly represented through narrow channels such as a single presidential address, a 
congressional report, or a national headline. These are all useful resources in which to address 
the cultural import and historically situated discourse surrounding the development and reception 
of scientific programs, however, they do not promote an in depth understanding of the vastness 
or complexity of interrelated factors which ultimately manifest themselves in seemingly finite 
technological objects like the Hubble Space Telescope.   
The Hubble Space Telescope was the largest and most technologically advanced civil 
scientific instrument of its time and as such it was developed among an even larger and more 
complex scientific and bureaucratic network over the course of many decades. Upon its launch in 
1990 it was revealed to have a flawed lens, an issue which was utilized by politicians and the 
media to vilify the overall state of NASA and the national space program. Hubble’s role as a 
representation of the national space program and a proxy for broader criticisms reflect the 
struggle of NASA to define itself beyond the military impetus of the Cold War and the struggle 
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of the American public to reconcile deep seated cultural memories of American exceptionalism 
in space with the realities of contemporary failures. The sheer enormity of big science programs 
make instruments like Hubble possible, but they also foster alienation between scientists and the 
general public. Hubble is a somewhat exceptional case of public redemption and unarguable 
scientific success in the modern U.S. space program, 
but it also demonstrates the inescapable impact of 
powerful military and economic actors to affect the 
success and perception of civil science programs. 
Although Hubble has been a mainstay for NASA since 
the space telescope was successfully repaired in 1993, 
it has also encapsulated a post-Cold War shift towards 
privatization and changing cultural priorities in space.  
Many of the conflicting viewpoints between politicians, scientists, the media, and the 
public, emerge in part out of the underlying struggle to negotiate the definition of “Science” and 
the roles that science and scientists should be expected to play. The cultural definition of science 
has changed over time as has the perception of the national space program and those entities 
involved with it. The broader perception of science is important because the nature of the 
relationship between scientists and non-scientists has a significant impact on the planning, 
development, and reception of large aerospace programs such as Hubble and the space shuttle. 
 
 
 
 
Image 1: Eagle Nebula, 1995 Hubble photo. 
Source: NASA, ESA, Hester & Scowen ASU. 
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Chapter 1: Defining the Role of Science  
The broader public and news media often perceive science as a neutral entity which is subject 
only to the data and “hard” facts gathered in the search for the truth. Robert K. Merton, the 
founder of the sociology of science, established a set of norms in 1942 which he believed 
represented the work of scientists. Merton’s five norms, “CUDOS”, consisted of: communalism, 
universalism, disinterestedness, originality, and skepticism.2 Although most of these norms have 
since received criticism within the scientific community, they represented “a persuasive 
formulation of the academic: detached, methodical and committed to the search for the truth 
rather than personal glorification.” 3 Despite the inherent and widespread influence of political, 
economic, and social agendas on scientific work, the idea of a neutral and altruistic science is 
still an omnipresent concept.  
 The idea of scientific facts being the constructions of individuals and processes, rather 
than preexisting truths uncovered only via research and an epiphanic moment has been raised by 
a number of scholars. Sociologists of science Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar argued that facts 
are socially constructed (or, merely constructed as Latour and Woolgar later contend that the 
pervasiveness of the term “social” has rendered it meaningless for their purposes)4 and that “the 
process of construction involves the use of certain devices whereby all traces of production are 
made extremely difficult to detect.”5 They elaborate on some of the issues associated with the 
social study of science: 
…we regard it as instructive to apprehend as strange those aspects of scientific activity 
which are readily taken for granted. It is evident that the uncritical acceptance of the 
                                                          
2 Robert Merton, “The Normative Structure of Science,” in The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigations, ed. N. Storer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), 267-278. 
3 B. Macfarlane, and M. Cheng. “Communism, Universalism, and Disinterestedness: Re-examining Contemporary 
Support among Academics for Merton’s Scientific Norms,” Journal of Academic Ethics 6, no. 1 (2008): 69-70. 
4 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1986), 281.  
5 Ibid, 176.  
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concepts and terminology used by some scientists has had the effect of enhancing rather 
than reducing the mystery which surrounds the doing of science. Paradoxically, our 
utilization of the notion of anthropological strangeness is intended to dissolve rather than 
reaffirm the exoticism with which science is sometimes associated.6 
 
The specialized language and culture of science can serve to further mystify scientific practice 
and scientists themselves, contributing to perceptions of elitism and detachment. Francesca 
Polletta of the sociology department at the University of California, Irvine, argued in a 2011 
article that “what passed as universal categories, neutral standards, scientific facts, and objective 
progress were actually stories: moralizing accounts whose claim to truth rested on their 
verisimilitude rather than their veracity.”7 The idea of scientific facts being constructed at least in 
part by way of microprocesses, internal scientific discourses, competition over authorship, and 
other factors comes in to direct conflict with Merton’s initially established norms and in conflict 
with the mainstream perception of a neutral or pure science.  
It was not until the second half of the twentieth century when the idealization of scientific 
neutrality began to be questioned by sociologists. Sal Restivo, a prominent scholar in the field of 
social science and technology, argued that it “required the political and social upheavals of the 
1960’s to sufficiently tarnish the image of science and scientists and create an intellectual 
atmosphere in which the sanctity of scientific knowledge itself could be challenged.” 8 In 
addition to the fears of growing corruption of the scientific community by political and military 
interests expressed by President Eisenhower and Alvin Weinberg in 1961, Eisenhower argued 
that “we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself 
become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.”9 There was a latent perception that the 
                                                          
6 Ibid, 29. 
7 Francesca Polletta, et al. “The Sociology of Storytelling” Annual Review of Sociology 37 (2011), 111. 
8 Sal Restivo, Science, Society, and Values: Toward a Sociology of Objectivity, (London: Associated University 
Presses, 1994), 4-5. 
9 Eisenhower, “Farewell Address,” 18-19. 
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utilitarianism of the scientific method was not necessarily governed by a distinct code of ethics 
and could therefore be a potential threat to social interests or human safety. Weinberg and some 
of his contemporaries likened this idea of a “dominant scientific caste” to that of a religious 
priesthood, in which knowledge is sacred, immutable, and only knowable to a relatively small 
subsection of society.10 The discussion of technology at the time took place in the constant 
shadow of the atomic bomb, which brought to the forefront the destructive potentiality of science 
and instigated fear of unbridled scientific development in general. Addressing this fear of 
misplaced scientific power, Eisenhower stipulated that “only an alert and knowledgeable 
citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of 
defense with our peaceful methods and goals.”11 It became clearer throughout the mid-century 
that science, and the relatively few who understood and were seen to command it, had to 
somehow be kept in check with the moral and political expectations of American society.  
The presence of a scientific and technological elite was and is still seen as a potential 
threat to democratic systems, as expressed long before the 1960’s by President Woodrow 
Wilson:  
God forbid that in a democratic society we should resign the task and give the 
government over to experts. What are we for if we are to be scientifically taken care of by 
a small number of gentlemen who are the only men who understand the job? Because if 
we don't understand the job, then we are not a free people.12 
 
The conflict between politicians with the agendas of their respective constituents and parties in 
mind, and specialized groups of scientists who are often the recipients of some kind of 
government sponsorship is an ongoing source of controversy especially when it comes to very 
                                                          
10 Weinberg, “Impact of Large-Scale Science…”, 1. 
11 Eisenhower, “Farewell Address,” 18-19. 
12 Woodrow Wilson, as cited by Ralph Lapp, The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power, (New 
York: Harper, 1965), 1. 
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large, expensive programs. Eisenhower said that it was necessary to “balance” and “integrate” 
these forces “—ever aiming toward the supreme goals of our free society.”13 At the root of this 
idea is a disagreement about what is and is not “good” for the people of a democracy; an 
ambiguous question which is continually contested. 
 Technological and scientific objects and development exist in a “world made up of 
institutions, values, interest groups, social classes, and political and economic forces,” but they 
are also a force in of themselves.14 Political and socio-economic trends and events are vital to the 
context in which technology and science manifests, however, technological objects are not 
merely passive reflections of the social contexts in which they appear. Rather, they are entities 
which can create historical change and alter discourse.  
Drawing in part from Latour, Michel Callon argued that the unique influence and power 
of science and technology requires an analysis which surpasses traditional sociological confines 
and addresses networks composed of both human and nonhuman entities.15 By “introducing 
unpredictable variations and new associations” the changing nature of scientific and 
technological entities necessitates the constant “rebuilding” of connections between the social 
and the natural. Callon argued, among others, that the conceptual framework of actor-networks 
make it possible to “describe the content of technical objects and theoretical knowledge.”16 In 
addition, John Law argued in a 1987 article that “historians and some sociologists are groping 
toward a method for studying the construction of and interaction between heterogeneous 
structures” and the actor-network framework 
                                                          
13 Eisenhower, “Farewell Address”, 19. 
14 Thomas P. Hughes, “Technological Momentum,” in Does Technology Drive History? Edited by Merrit Roe Smith 
and Leo Marx (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 102. 
15 Michel Callon, “The Sociology of an Actor-Network: The Case of the Electric Vehicle.” in Michel Callon, John 
Law, Arie Rip, eds. Mapping the Dynamics of Science and Technology (London: MacMillan, 1986), 20. 
16 Ibid., 23. 
 
 
12 
 
makes use of a vocabulary that does not distinguish among the social, the scientific, the 
technological, the economic, and the political, and makes no a priori assumptions that one 
of these carries greater explanatory weight than all the others. Rather, it displays the 
strategies of system-building and, in particular, the heterogeneous and conflicting field of 
forces within which technological problems are posed and solved.17 
 
Law argued that to address social factors alone to analyze technological change is reductionary 
and significantly narrows the comprehension of scientific objects. Callon identified the process 
of translating large scientific networks for broader non-scientific audiences as a primary way in 
which they are often oversimplified and even trivialized.  
 The scientific or technical object is not experienced as a concrete entity until the actor-
networks which constitute it are simplified or converted through the process of translation. 
Translation entails the simplification of large systems such as Hubble into something which can 
be represented and more easily understood as a singular object. Translation occurs in part when 
“entities are converted into inscriptions, reports, memoranda, documents, survey results, 
scientific papers…There are also movements of materials and of money. Translation cannot be 
effective, i.e. lead to stable constructions, if it is not anchored to such movements, to physical 
and social displacements.”18 Translation is important to the way in which information is 
consumed, ultimately placing one or few institutions or entities in charge of projecting and 
displaying the scientific object which has manifested from an “infinitely complex world” of 
interacting networks.19 
                                                          
17 John Law, “On the Social Explanation of Technical Change: The Case of the Portuguese Maritime Expansion,” 
Technology and Culture, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Apr., 1987), 252. 
18 Callon, “Sociology of an Actor-Network…”, 27. 
19 Ibid., 29. 
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 In the case of Hubble, NASA was largely the translator, or the most significant 
institution responsible for reducing and representing the configuration of networks which created 
the space telescope. Congress would ultimately refer to NASA officials and scientists for 
financial and technological reports, as well as relying largely on NASA as a regulating entity for 
contractors and scientific bodies involved in the development of Hubble systems. Callon stated 
that “to translate is to speak for, to be indispensable, and to displace. All translation works to 
solidify actor-worlds. 
Successful translation quickly 
makes us forget its history.”20 
This simplification and 
displacement inherent to the 
process of translation becomes 
very problematic when the 
system, or a single element of 
the system, fails. In this case, 
Hubble was launched with a flawed primary mirror which quickly became evident through the 
blurrier than expected images which were widely publicized after being retrieved by NASA.  
The 1990 Allen Commission which headed the Hubble flaw investigation attempted in 
part to grasp and identify the systemic issues which played a part in the failure, but ultimately it 
was NASA which had to absorb the majority of the blame. The way in which big science 
programs must be simplified into more easily digestible terms creates a distinct disconnect 
between scientists and everyone else. Not only does the reduction of an object like Hubble to a 
                                                          
20 Callon, “Sociology of an Actor-Network…”, 28. 
Image 2: Exploded View of the Hubble Space Telescope.  
Source: NASA, Lockheed, “Servicing Mission Guide,” 1993. 
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few pages of a report or a few minutes in front of a committee misrepresent the magnitude of 
work involved in its construction, but it also makes Hubble and the entities and individuals 
which represent it extremely vulnerable to wide-ranging critique. In this case, NASA and 
NASA’s entire culture was widely held responsible by politicians and the media alike, although 
Hubble constituted a system which existed far and beyond the confines of the American civil 
space agency. Eric Chaisson of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics touched on 
some of the immense intricacies of Hubble’s development: 
All of us knew that the Hubble Space Telescope is the most complex piece of scientific 
equipment ever built by humans. “It’s a little like being chief engineer for the pyramids,” 
deadpanned Dave Skillman, the lead Hubble engineer at Goddard…Not just the most 
powerful telescope or the most expensive scientific gadget, Hubble is also hellishly 
complicated to schedule and operate effectively. The magnitude of the effort needed to 
build just the Science Operations Ground System (SOGS), will suffice as an example. 
Comprising the computer instructions to command and control Hubble in orbit as well as 
to acquire and calibrate its captured data on the ground, all of SOGS amounted at launch 
to roughly 3 million lines of (mostly Fortran and C*) computer code… SOGS contains 
the equivalent of almost 2,000 man-years of computer programming written by a small 
army of a couple hundred individuals at the TRW Corporation and the Science Institute, 
none of whom knows precisely how the entire system works. In fact, Hubble’s ground 
system exceeds in magnitude that of any computer program needed to operate any other 
known machine- at least in the civilian world…No human or group of humans could 
reasonably analyze the logic of all aspects of such a megaprogram as the above-
mentioned SOGS, which when first introduced into a realistic operating environment had 
a voracious appetite for mistakes. At least one NASA headquarters official, openly 
worried before launch about the project’s ability to master the telescope’s myriad 
operating modes, let alone to identify the potential for untested conflict among literally 
millions of interacting machine instructions, put it bluntly: “Frankly, my problems would 
be best solved if we plop the damn thing directly into the Atlantic.”21 
 
This quote demonstrates a single aspect of Hubble’s structure which is by itself impossible for a 
single person “or group of humans” to fully have control over. Hubble was created through the 
interaction and cohesion of many different instruments and programs with similarly massive 
levels of complexity. The nature of big science programs necessitates the growing size and 
                                                          
21 Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, 52-53. 
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complexity of systems which ultimately overwhelm individual entities and agencies and require 
the successful interdependence of many different parts. Through the process of translation and 
simplification, the Hubble as a whole was initially represented as a failure, despite the successful 
development of myriad systems far and beyond the primary mirror and the other instruments 
which experienced issues. When an exceedingly complex and culturally encumbered program 
such as Hubble or the space shuttle does not live up to expectations, it becomes necessary in the 
public eye to isolate who or what is to blame, despite the inherent interconnectedness of network 
actors.   
Callon argued that due to the complexity of these networks which form scientific objects, 
“in the absence of one ingredient the whole would break down.”22 When an element within the 
complex networks of big science programs like Hubble or the space shuttle fail, the actors which 
had existed in the background are exposed to scrutiny as the existing translation disintegrates. 
Latour illustrates this process with the example of the space shuttle Columbia:  
Take any object: At first, it looks contained within itself with well-delineated edges and 
limits; then something happens, a strike, an accident, a catastrophe, and suddenly you 
discover swarms of entities that seem to have been there all along but were not visible 
before and that appear in retrospect necessary for its sustenance. You thought the 
Columbia shuttle was an object ready to fly in the sky, and then suddenly, after the 
dramatic 2003 explosion, you realize that it needed NASA and its complex organizational 
body to fly safely in the sky… The action of flying a technical object has been 
redistributed throughout a highly composite network where bureaucratic routines are just 
as important as equations and material resistance. Yes, it is a strange space, that of a 
shuttle, that is just as much in the sky as inside NASA, but that’s precisely the space—
hard to describe and even harder to draw—that has been made visible by the deployment 
of network in my sense of the word.23 
 
Latour went on to argue that “the shuttle Columbia was not an object whose substance could be 
defined, but an array of conditions so unexpected that the lack of one of them (a bureaucratic 
                                                          
22 Callon, “Sociology of an Actor-Network…”, 23. 
23 Bruno Latour, “Networks, Societies, Spheres: Reflections of an Actor-Network Theorist,” International Journal 
of Communications 5 (2011), 797. 
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routine) was enough to destroy the machine.”24 Although the particular problems which are 
determined to have caused big science catastrophes can often be isolated through a process of 
inquiry and investigation, whether it be icicles on the launch pad or an errant piece of foam 
insulation, the entire vast network of agencies, technology, and people, bear the implications of 
failure, although only a few entities experience the repercussions. 
In the case of Hubble, the intersection of a nearly innumerable number of entities came 
together in order to represent one simplified scientific object. Hubble, and events which 
accompanied its development, were not singly the result of NASA or of Congress, but of many 
significant parts including: Marshall Space Flight Center, Goddard, Perkin-Elmer, Lockheed, the 
Space Telescope Science Institute, the administrators, scientists, astronomers, and engineers at 
all of these locations, the primary mirror, solar arrays, fine guidance sensors and other 
instruments, congressional committees on appropriations, senators and representatives, research 
universities vying for time to use the telescope, the European Space Agency, the space shuttle 
development and launches, space enthusiasts, and amateur astronomers, among others. The 
Hubble Space Telescope was created through an incredibly complex network of relationships 
and interactions which took place over the course of many decades, and to attempt to address a 
scientific object from this perspective “means acknowledging something of the unresolvable 
tension, the inseparable mixture, the impossible multiplicity, out of which intention and expertise 
must emerge.”25 The spherical aberration in Hubble’s primary mirror was a relatively small 
malfunction which exposed the entire network of people and institutions involved in the program 
to the critique of the public. Although a small number of NASA officials and scientists had to 
                                                          
24 Ibid., 798. 
25 Timothy Mitchell, “Can the Mosquito Speak?” in Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002) 53. 
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represent the entirety of the Hubble program when it was launched, and when it was perceived to 
have failed, they were only a small element in an incredibly complex story of how Hubble came 
to be, how it was flawed, and on what terms it was redeemed. 
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Chapter 2: Early History of Hubble and the Emergence of Big Science 
Although it was not fully realized until the 1990’s, the roots of Hubble’s development could be 
traced back to the first telescopes which were developed in the 1500’s. For the purposes of this 
analysis the rapid increase in technological development which accompanied World War II and 
the Cold War that followed was most significant in ushering in an era of big science and space 
science. Without the growth of military sponsored science, it is unlikely that NASA or the 
national space program as it is today would have come to be. The networks of development, 
administration, and science which formed the Hubble Space Telescope were embedded in the 
early establishment of the military and civil space programs.  
The first satellites owe their technological catalyst to the development of the 
Vergeltungswaffe zwei (V-2) ballistic missile by Wernher von Braun in World War II. Von 
Braun’s team of scientists in Peenemünde along with thousands of slave laborers developed the 
first man-made object to enter space. The V-2 rocket infamously caused more loss of life in its 
construction under the Nazi regime than in its successful deployment against Allied targets.26 
However, in the post-war United States the V-2 was repurposed in part to become the first 
sounding rocket to gather scientific data from beyond the ozone layer.27 When the war in Europe 
ended in 1945, the U.S. Project Paperclip oversaw the extraction of many German scientists to 
the United States as well as several intact V-2 rockets and hundreds of train cars worth of 
German rocket parts. These scientists went on to work in a number of different applications; von 
                                                          
26 Robert Smith, The Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science, Technology, and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 28. 
27 Todd Neff, From Jars to the Stars: How Ball Came to Build a Comet-Hunting Machine (Denver: Earthview 
Media, 2010), 12-13. 
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Braun extended his work on the V-2 rocket at White Sands Proving Ground in New Mexico 
under the auspices of the U.S. military.28   
At White Sands in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s, the V-2 rocket served as a host for 
many scientific experiments attempting to gather data on the upper atmosphere. Instead of 
explosives, the V-2 rockets were filled with instruments measuring everything from temperature 
to ultra-violet rays.29 The V-2 could surpass the Karman line, which is generally accepted as the 
boundary of outer space; this meant its data gathering capacities soon surpassed that of the 
weather balloons which had previously been used. Corliss argues that post-Sputnik scientific 
satellites owed their existence “almost completely to military stimuli- hot and cold” although 
“the impact of Peenemünde on the development of scientific satellites was not in the concept of 
the idea-no one had yet suggested the unmanned, purely scientific satellite- but rather in the 
creation and refinement of supporting technology.”30 The V-2 rocket was the first step beyond 
earth’s atmosphere, and although it’s legacy during and after WWII remains largely defined by 
its military use, von Braun and his team would continue to improve upon the V-2 technology and 
future iterations would launch the United States’ first scientific satellite and the first two 
American astronauts into space.  
The intellectual possibility of a scientific satellite was conceptualized by the U.S. military 
as early as 1945 when the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics established the Committee for Evaluating 
the Feasibility of Space Rocketry, which “recommended launching a small satellite for scientific 
purposes.”31 In 1946 the RAND Report, or “Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-
Circling Spaceship” was published at the request of the U.S. military, whose branches had at that 
                                                          
28 Willy Ley, Rockets, Missiles, and Space Travel. (New York: The Viking Press, 1958), 246. 
29 Neff, From Jars to the Stars, 12-13. 
30 William Corliss, Scientific Satellites (Washington D.C.: Office of Technology Utilization, NASA, 1967), 37-38. 
31 Corliss, Scientific Satellites, 38. 
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time failed to come to agreement on a satellite program.32 This report was important to the 
development of the satellite program for a number of reasons; it concluded that satellites of all 
kind, military, scientific, or human occupied, were technologically feasible within a matter of 
years.33 In addition to providing an overview of the technological and scientific data available, 
possible challenges, and cost assessments of hypothetical satellite vehicles, the RAND report 
also approximated the scientific and cultural impact of satellite development:  
Though the crystal ball is cloudy, two things seem clear: 
1. A satellite vehicle with appropriate instrumentation can be expected to be one of the 
most potent scientific tools of the Twentieth Century. 
2. The achievement of a satellite craft by the United States would inflame the 
imagination of mankind, and would probably produce repercussions in the world 
comparable to the explosion of the atomic bomb.34 
 
The compilers of the RAND report were undoubtedly aware of their inability to predict the 
future, but their somewhat grandiose rhetoric was not necessarily that far off the mark. Although 
the development of satellites beyond Sputnik would be significantly more gradual than the 
instantaneous world-wide reaction which accompanied the use of the atomic bomb, the RAND 
report seemed to accurately foresee the array of potentially paradigm changing possibilities 
associated with the satellite concept.  
 The RAND report surveyed the possibility of many different types of man-made orbiting 
objects, including long-range ballistics. However, an appendix to the report and important 
astronomical treatise: “Astronomical Advantages of an Extra-Terrestrial Observatory” by Lyman 
Spitzer, Jr. focused specifically on the “new vistas of astronomical research” that could be 
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possible with an orbiting satellite observatory.35,36 Spitzer’s paper enumerated the many benefits 
that an orbiting observatory could have over terrestrial observatories in terms of astronomical 
data about the universe.  
Among other points, Spitzer notes the lack of atmospheric pollution and the constant 
presence in the space environment as aspects of an extra-terrestrial observatory, which would 
make it substantially more efficient and successful than terrestrial observatories. Spitzer’s 1946 
work effectively laid the groundwork for what would become the Hubble Space Telescope many 
decades later. Spitzer was confident in the profound cultural impact of a large orbiting 
observatory, stating:  
…the chief contribution of such a radically new and more powerful instrument would be, 
not to supplement our present ideas of the universe we live in, but rather to uncover new 
phenomena not yet imagined, and perhaps to modify profoundly our basic concepts of 
space and time.37 
 
In this way Spitzer defines a purpose for this hypothetical large space telescope that is not 
subject to the fluctuation of politics or military need. Smith notes that “by separating the 
telescope’s justification from particular astronomical questions” Spitzer made an argument for 
the telescope that was “timeless” in its scientific virtue.38  
Spitzer and a small community of other astronomers at this time were confident in the 
scientific value of a satellite observatory, however the broader scientific community had yet to 
be convinced of the feasibility of satellites in general. It would be a decade until the launch of 
Sputnik and the official start of the Space Race when satellite observatories would even be 
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considered as viable large-scale aspects of the space program. Spitzer’s large satellite 
observatory had specifically scientific applications, however in the years leading up to the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) the U.S. military was decidedly present in satellite 
development. 
 Initially deemed too expensive and complex, the progress of satellite technology 
combined with increasing Cold War pressure inspired the U.S. military to pursue the possibility 
of satellite reconnaissance in the late 1940’s. The forthcoming IGY was intended to promote 
worldwide peaceful scientific discourse and study of the earth’s environments; in honor of which 
President Eisenhower’s Project Vanguard was meant to oversee the successful launch of a 
scientific satellite in 1957. 39 
 The impact of the successful launch of Sputnik I on the American political and cultural 
psyche cannot be overstated. The success of the Soviet launch implied a superior launch platform 
and more powerful rockets, implicit in which was the Soviet ability to launch nuclear weapons. 
The socio-cultural divisions between the United States and the Soviet Union amplified the 
gravitas of the event and the war over international prestige began in earnest. Exacerbated by the 
end of WWII and McCarthyism, pre-existing anti-communist beliefs fueled the hysteria 
surrounding the successful launch of Sputnik I and the utter failure of America’s Vanguard I. 
Vanguard I, meant to be the United States’ first satellite, exploded on the launch pad while being 
broadcast live on televisions across the country.40,41 Partially in reaction to the mounting 
pressures of the space race which the United States appeared to be losing, President Eisenhower 
was took steps to further integrate civil and military aerospace development.  
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When the Vanguard program seemingly faltered in 1957, the prestigious pressure of the 
Sputnik 1 success…caused the Secretary of Defense to announce on Nov. 8, 1957 that the 
Army was also to participate in the IGY satellite program. In making this decision, 
President Eisenhower permitted the Army to employ military rockets that had been 
specifically denied to the Vanguard Program because of the desire to keep the U.S. effort 
free from military overtones. On January 31st, 1958, the Army launched the first U.S. 
satellite, Explorer 1, using a Juno I rocket-a modified Jupiter rocket, which, in turn, was 
derived from the Redstone, which, to complete the chain, owed much to V-2 
technologies.42 
 
The success of Explorer I was not enough to make up for the embarrassment of Vanguard and 
the national perception of Sputnik’s success. Sputnik’s success and the onset of the so-called 
Space Race led in part to the establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration by President Eisenhower.   
 The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act clearly stated that NASA would be 
established under the guidelines that it be a civilian institution “devoted to peaceful purposes for 
the benefit of all mankind”, shall contribute to a number of scientific objectives, and preserve the 
“role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and space science.”43 The act specifically 
relegated all aerospace activity related to weaponry or national defense as the responsibility of 
the Department of Defense (DOD); it also maintained that “discoveries that have military value 
or significance” should be furnished to the DOD, and likewise non-military discoveries should 
be furnished to NASA. Although this original Space Act provided for a certain level of shared 
knowledge between NASA and the DOD, the two remained strictly distinct from one another.  
This relationship between the “civilian” NASA and the DOD became increasingly 
convoluted and controversial as the Space Race wore on and the two agencies embraced larger 
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and more complex technological projects which often overlapped in many respects. Smith notes 
that: 
Although NASA was created as a civilian agency, the new technologies that allowed men 
and machines to move around in space always had national security implications and 
applications…the separation of national security from civilian research and development 
of space technology would therefore be almost meaningless.44, 45 
 
The power dynamic between NASA, congress, and the DOD, had significant effects on 
technological development as well as on administrative strategies surrounding the national space 
program. The cultural and financial clout of the DOD had the ability to overwhelm the less 
charismatic civilian scientific projects of NASA scientists, opening the gates for legislative 
support and funding to be provided to programs with military and commercial incentives.  
The ideology of the space race entailed what was essentially a competition between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union as a form of public and ideological spectacle. Wolfe argues that “for all their 
differences, leaders in both the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that massive displays 
of technological might were critical weapons in the international battle for hearts and minds.”46 
Inherent in the formation of NASA was the need to “beat” the Soviets, which meant space 
strategy was always formulated with prestige and “space spectaculars” in mind.47  
Although the political pressures of the Cold War may have diverted attention away from 
a purely civilian scientific agenda, the launch of Sputnik I and proceeding space race “reshaped 
the thinking of politicians to such an extent that many old assumptions about the federal funding 
of space activities were promptly swept away. The usual rules on Capitol Hill lapsed for a time 
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as the legislators could hardly dispense money to NASA fast enough.”48 Without the political 
impetus, many NASA activities and related scientific programs would never have had the federal 
interest or funding to exist. The activities and success of NASA and the space program came to 
represent capitalism, democracy, and the American role in the world just as much as it 
represented science, which meant that from the beginning NASA activities would be closely 
monitored and assessed by congress to ensure NASA’s successful representation of the 
American image in the world.  
 Although the intersection of NASA technology and national defense programs would be 
inevitable, Wolfe argues that: 
It would be a mistake to fixate on military endeavors in understanding the role of science 
in the Cold War state. Starting with legislation that established the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC) in 1946, American scientists fought to maintain a separate arena for 
military science. The existence of such civilian institutions as the AEC, the National 
Science Foundation, and NASA were critical to both policymakers’ and the public’s 
ability to see science as an objective, transparent way of knowing that could transcend 
differences between interest groups.49 
 
The idea of science as a neutral method in which to pursue the fundamental questions about life, 
space, and time is a keystone of scientific inquiry and philosophy that has long been touted by 
scientists, included Spitzer in his landmark paper on space satellites.  Science as a force 
transcendent of temporal issues is an ideal consistently present in scientific communities of 
discourse, but which has always been somewhat at odds with the reality of political, social, 
religious, and military interests. When the space race began in earnest in the 1960’s, “this idea of 
‘open science’ sat uneasily next to the reality of a research infrastructure that was largely backed 
by the state-particularly military-interests.”50 This intersection of pure scientific inquiry and the 
                                                          
48 Smith, The Space Telescope, 37. 
49 Wolfe, Competing with the Soviets…, 5. 
50 Ibid. 
 
 
26 
 
political necessities of the Cold War provided the basis for rising fears about the nature of the 
industrial defense industry and the distortion of scientific practice.  
 In the shadow of President John F. Kennedy’s inauguration, President Eisenhower’s 
farewell speech was at the time largely overlooked. President Eisenhower coined the term 
“military-industrial complex” in the speech and expressed deep-seated concerns about the 
growth of military technology and the increasing role of the Federal government in determining 
the path of research and development. Eisenhower warned against the “potential for the 
disastrous rise of misplaced power” due to the increasingly “formalized, complex, and costly” 
concentration of research and development at the federal level. He noted that:  
Partly because of the huge costs involved, a government contract becomes, virtually, a 
substitute for intellectual curiosity. The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars 
by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present—
and is gravely to be regarded.51 
 
Eisenhower feared that the supposedly altruistic neutrality of scientific pursuit would be 
corrupted and eclipsed by the rising power of defense industries. Although his views represented 
a somewhat idealized conception of science, he was accurately aware that the institutional role of 
science was changing and would have cultural, political, and technological consequences 
throughout the Cold War era and beyond. 
In the same year as President Eisenhower’s farewell address, Alvin Weinberg, director of 
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, acknowledged the increasing presence of large-scale 
scientific projects and argued: 
When history looks at the 20th century, she will see the science and technology as its 
theme; she will find in the monuments of Big Science—the huge rockets, the high-energy 
accelerators, the high-flux research reactors—symbols of our time just as surely as she 
finds in Notre Dame a symbol of the Middle Ages…We build our monuments in the 
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name of scientific truth; they build theirs in the name of religious truth; we use our Big 
Science to add to our country’s prestige, they used their churches for their cities’ 
prestige.52 
 
Central to Weinberg’s analysis was the risk that the growth of big science would become 
enormously expensive and that it could threaten the more benevolent and pure scientific pursuits 
which serve to enlighten humankind in some way or another. The introduction of big science as a 
new technological trend opened the door to criticism of large government run programs in favor 
of supposedly less corruptible “small” science. Big science in the national space program began 
largely with Apollo. Although Apollo was ultimately considered one of, if not the most efficient 
and successful example of big science in American aerospace, the questionable justification for 
the program was not lost on contemporary (or future) observers. Suggested partly by his use of 
religious monuments as a metaphor, Weinberg suggests that there are ethical problems with the 
combination of science and the state.  
Weinberg feared that big science turned scientists into lobbyists, scientific peer-review 
into media-driven popularity contests, and academic lecture halls into congressional committee 
rooms. Weinberg acknowledged the inevitability of big science but he lamented the transition to 
overbearing administrative systems and the proclivity towards “Big Science spectaculars” rather 
than more fundamental scientific questions. This tendency towards prestige-driven science 
versus more academically productive scientific projects was embodied in the Apollo program’s 
emphasis on manned spaceflight and President Kennedy’s goal to go to the moon.53 
When the Soviets successfully launched Yuri Gagarin into orbit on April 12th 1961, the 
United States was once again reminded that it was falling behind in the space race. Emphasizing 
the importance of maintaining international prestige, President Kennedy provided the political 
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justification and funding to make Apollo the United States’ most successful manned space 
program. Roger Launius, senior curator for the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, has written 
quite extensively on NASA history and argues that the Space Race was always driven more by 
politics than by science and technology. Launius argues that President Kennedy’s famous 
speeches in 1961 and 1962 have in some ways been misconstrued throughout time in a way that 
obscures the real historical and political issues at stake during the time period.54 Rita Koman, of 
the Organization for American Historians, makes a similar argument and points out that 
“[Kennedy’s] actions…played on American fears of communism and implicitly inferred that the 
Eisenhower administration had not done enough to meet the Sputnik challenge.”55 The Apollo 
program is one of the best examples of what large-scale scientific projects can accomplish in a 
very short amount of time, given the budget is generous and the mission goals are clearly defined 
and publically supported. 
The Apollo program and its culmination with men landing on the moon has had the most 
indelible and profound effect on the American perception of the space program. NASA was 
provided an unprecedented amount of funds and the technological and intellectual resources 
were all in place to pursue an unprecedented goal and take command of the space race. Tied to 
the significant increase in NASA resources, smaller science programs such as the Orbiting 
Astronomical Observatory (OAO) program were able to thrive throughout the 1960’s. Although 
the Kennedy administration stressed an emphasis on programs that would be the most 
prestigious, namely manned spaceflight, NASA administrator James E. Webb fought to maintain 
a well-balanced space program that looked towards future goals as much as possible. The OAO 
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satellites provided the first ultra-violet light data, and although two out of four missions failed, 
the program effectively laid the groundwork for what would become the Great Observatories 
program and the Hubble Space Telescope.56 
Unlike the fiscally conservative views of President Eisenhower before him, Kennedy was 
prepared to commit substantial resources to the manned spaceflight program. NASA’s budget 
would never be higher than in the mid 1960’s at the height of the Apollo program, accounting for 
approximately 4.5% of the entire federal budget at its highest point in 1963 (compared to 
approximately .5% presently).57, 58 Despite the cultural achievement and historical significance of 
the Apollo program, it was not the most scientifically viable direction for the space program to 
take. Kennedy’s decision to support the manned spaceflight program was not recommended by 
his science advisors, who argued that “NASA would be better off investing in robots and 
unmanned probes…the first U.S. satellite, Explorer I, scored an impressive scientific 
achievement by revealing the existence of the Van Allen radiation belt, and it had done so 
without putting lives unnecessarily at risk.”59 The technological, political, and cultural risk of 
successfully completing a manned moon-landing was immense, as historian Audra Wolfe put it: 
“the only thing worse than being the second nation to put a man on the Moon would be to kill a 
series of charismatic astronauts in the process.”60  
Three astronauts, however, were killed in the process of preparing for a potential moon 
landing. In early 1967, Gus Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee burned to death in a practice 
Apollo command module while training on launch pad 34 at Cape Kennedy. Grissom was one of 
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the original Mercury 7 astronauts, 
was the second man in space, and 
was a popular choice to be the first 
person to step on the moon.61 The 
astronauts had expressed concerns 
about the design of the capsule 
beforehand and it was ultimately 
determined that the tragedy was 
caused by a number of preventable flaws in the design of the command module and the training 
procedures.62 The astronaut’s widows eventually received settlements from North American 
Rockwell, the contractor of the Apollo module, and NASA was intensely scrutinized and 
criticized by congress. Despite the loss, the Soviet threat and the imminent possibility of the 
moon landing facilitated NASA and the public’s recovery from the tragedy. Testing continued 
and the Apollo spacecraft was flight ready and orbiting the moon by the next year. The 
resounding technical achievement and cultural impact of the moon landing was sufficient enough 
in part to palliate the deaths that occurred in 1967, however, the recovery process would not be 
so straightforward in the wake of the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. 
The technological and philosophical grandeur of successful celestial travel provided only 
a brief respite from changing cultural trends at the end of the 1960’s which increasingly saw the 
space program as little more than a “distraction from the United States’ limited achievements in 
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conquering poverty, racial inequality, and urban violence.”63 The American public gradually 
became acclimated to the climate of the Cold War and turned their attention towards more 
immediate social issues, increasingly de-emphasizing the cultural importance of the space 
program. 
This cultural shift was evident in the re-evaluation of the space program by President 
Nixon’s administration in the early 1970’s. The Apollo program puttered to a relatively quiet 
close despite five more successful lunar landings and President Nixon approved the development 
of the space shuttle in 1972. The space shuttle was chosen after the rejection of NASA’s initially 
proposed plans for a Mars mission and an orbiting space station because of high costs.64 Other 
scientific space missions, such as the large satellite observatory and the space shuttle, would 
compete with each other for funding allocation throughout the 1970’s. Unlike the relatively swift 
development and realization of Apollo’s mission goals in less than a decade, the space shuttle 
and the large satellite observatory program would not be realized for the next 20 and 30 years, 
respectively.  
As America’s role in the world changed, Americans and the international community 
began to question the quest for prestige as well as technological and cultural dominance. Big 
Science in the American space program came to be associated with increasingly antiquated 
imperialist ideals and militarism,  
The Apollo program was designed to display and ensure American dominance; much of 
the underlying research was classified; and the majority of American space efforts were 
at least as much about producing missiles and spy satellites as they were about creating 
new scientific knowledge. The pretense of civilian leadership gave American image-
makers the possibility of having it both ways.65 
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In the context of socio-economic and political changes in the second half of the twentieth 
century, the mere “pretense” of civilian leadership was no longer enough. The military and the 
space program had developed an intimate partnership, and as a result the public questioned the 
neutrality, necessity, and relevance of the space program.  
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Chapter 3: Impact of the Space Shuttle 
Space spectaculars like the moon landing provide justification for scientific research because of 
their visible and tangible results which bolster American cultural narratives of overcoming odds 
and crossing frontiers. Big science provided the means to go to the moon, however, the cultural 
and political changes which began in the late 1960’s such as the civil rights and anti-war 
movements shifted national priorities enough to significantly strip funding away from the space 
program. Despite the winding down of the space race 
in 1975 with the joint Apollo-Soyuz test program 
between the U.S. and Russia, space spectaculars and 
the desire for international prestige still weighed 
heavily on the space program. NASA attempted to 
meet the expectations of Apollo with equally 
ambitious and scientifically compelling programs, 
however, it became clear that the public support and 
political funding which allowed the extensive program 
to function would not be so easily accessible in the 
1970’s and 1980’s.  
An article written in 1969 by George Mueller, then Associate Administrator of NASA, 
illustrates the incredible optimism and high expectations which characterized the perception of 
the space program after the moon landing:  
This day man’s oldest dream is made a reality—this day the ancient bonds tying him to 
the earth have been broken. Apollo has given us a new freedom. With the achievement of 
the first manned landing on the surface of the moon, we have accomplished the most 
momentous feat in the long history of man. The triumph of Apollo is nevertheless only 
the beginning—it has given us the confidence to dream those impossible dreams…For 
Image 4: Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, 1975. 
Source: Time Magazine Archive. 
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men of all nations, and of all stations, Apollo is a portent of progress, a benign symbol of 
their ability and of their civilization.66 
 
This article, published in the New York 
Times, goes on to enumerate the multitude 
of space programs that would likely 
prosper throughout the 1970’s. At the time 
it was considered technologically feasible 
that by the end of the 1970’s there would 
be a near constant human presence on the 
moon to conduct research, an orbiting space station that could conduct a wide variety of research 
including a “high energy cosmic ray and high energy physics laboratory,” and a low-cost, 
reusable space vehicle which would allow travel not only to the moon, but to planets.67 This 
enthusiasm was rapidly curtailed by political and cultural changes which made it clear that the 
same resources and support which had made Apollo so successful would not be available in the 
same way for future programs.   
 The percentage of the federal budget which was allocated to NASA steadily fell 
throughout the 1970’s and into the 1980’s, hovering at approximately .8%.68 President Nixon 
began in early 1970 with a 12.5% budget cut which meant the closing of facilities and 
termination of thousands of NASA jobs. Despite these cuts and schedule delays, it was still 
predicted that the shuttle would be operable by the late 1970’s and a manned mission to Mars 
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would occur in the 1980’s.69 The choice of the space shuttle program was critiqued from very 
early on as economically unfeasible and of questionable scientific utility. Liberal democrats in 
the Senate including William Proxmire and Walter F. Mondale advocated for amendments in 
1971 which would have completely cut the shuttle program and created a cap on military 
spending. Mondale argued for a reprioritization of federal spending and asked whether the space 
shuttle was “more important than safe streets, clean air and water and freedom from deadly 
disease?”70 The amendments were ultimately struck down but they reflect the consistent political 
vulnerability that characterized the shuttle program from the beginning.71 Mondale went on to 
serve as the vice president under Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981, an administration which put 
little priority on the space program. A contemporary reporter lamented the state of the space 
program during the late 1970’s: “Gone are the ecstatic calls from the Oval Office to the surface 
of the moon and the program was rarely, if ever, mentioned in last year’s [1976] Presidential 
campaign. President Carter made a cursory 30-minute inspection trip to NASA headquarters 
about two months ago…but he did not even mention the future of the space program.”72 
Although many large and costly NASA programs were being developed throughout the 1970’s, 
many did not come to fruition and were not situated in the public eye until the 1980’s and later. 
Having successfully reached the moon and lacking a powerful new directive, the state of 
the U.S. space program was drastically changed from the 1960’s to the 1970’s. Many people 
were left in the dark and with unanswered questions regarding the direction of new space based 
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programs such as the shuttle. Brian O’ Leary, a scientist, author, and astronaut, predicted in 1971 
that the initial budget appropriation for the shuttle program would be 
Merely the tip of the iceberg of what might become one of the nation’s costliest 
boondoggles of all time… [The shuttle would be economical] only if there were more 
than one flight per week for several years, perhaps decades. In fact, NASA proposes sixty 
flights per year, of which thirty are earmarked for defense. Why should NASA spend 
money for a defense project, a very questionable one at that? Inevitably, we are left with 
a hardware system looking for something to do, rather than a pre-existing motivation to 
use the hardware.73  
 
He believed that in the light of “more pressing domestic problems” an unmanned spacecraft 
would be safer, cheaper, and a more efficient way to collect scientific data. O’ Leary expressed 
concern that the popular emphasis on manned spaceflight was leading the space program in a 
direction which was justified more by the romanticized past than by scientific productivity. 
Many other scientists and officials, including Wernher von Braun, were openly wary of the high 
costs of the space shuttle and questioned the government’s willingness and ability to provide 
adequate funding.74  Although the space shuttle program failed to meet budgetary restraints or 
scheduled deadlines, there were still very successful scientific programs which took place in the 
1970’s. President Nixon’s plan for a “Grand Tour” of the solar system conducted by space 
probes was probably, in the long term, one of the most productive and successful NASA 
programs.75 Voyager 1 and 2 launched right on schedule in 1977 and have provided a nearly 
unmatched amount of scientific data and traveled farther away from Earth than any other 
manmade object. The Voyager missions cost NASA approximately $900 million over the course 
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of nearly four decades of functionality, while the space shuttle program was already over budget 
by $1 billion (for a total of approximately $6 billion) before any launches had occurred.76 
In the early 1970’s, the space shuttle and the Large Space Telescope program (which 
became Hubble) were tied together to make a more appealing bid to congress. The NASA 
Offices of Manned Space Flight and Space Science argued that the reusable nature of the space 
shuttle would make payloads such as the Large Space Telescope (LST) more flexible and cost-
efficient.77 The space shuttle was approved by President Nixon in 1972. In 1974, with money 
already spent on the Mars Viking program and Skylab, the congress House Appropriations 
Subcommittee suggested that a “less expensive and less ambitious project be considered as a 
possible alternative” to the Large Space Telescope Program. The space shuttle had a somewhat 
easier time receiving initial funding compared to the LST because the idea of a reusable and 
manned space vehicle was immediately appealing to the public. Historian of science and 
technology at the University of Alberta, Robert Smith wrote that “because it was, in the agency’s 
view, far and away its most important program- the one that underpinned all its space activities- 
the shuttle took the bulk of the money the agency was receiving for design and development.”78 
Despite its early critiques, the Space Shuttle Program was more relatable, more charismatic, and 
easier to justify politically than other specifically scientific and civilian NASA programs.  
 As the Large Space Telescope program almost lost all of its congressional backing in 
1974, NASA officials, astronomers, and contractors came together to bolster political support for 
the program. Contractors such as Perkin-Elmer, which had begun studies on the Optical 
Telescope Assembly, as well as McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed were able to lobby 
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politicians in a way that civil service employees at NASA could not. Some astronomers, such as 
Lyman Spitzer, directly engaged themselves in lobbying for the LST. At the time it was 
unprecedented for scientists to engage in politics as they did not yet have a professional lobbying 
organization and it was largely seen as “beneath the dignity of science.”79 This attitude was 
illustrative of how scientific practice was often elevated to a higher moral standard by 
practitioners and non-scientists alike, and how the scientific and political realms could become 
alienated from one another as a result of their predisposed discourses. LST supporters also 
approached what would become the European Space Agency to partake in the project, primarily 
as a way to unburden themselves of some of the development costs. The design of Hubble was 
reassessed in a way which would allow international collaboration, fit an increasingly limited 
budget, and would satisfy the scientific community, NASA, congress, international interests, and 
contractor interests. 
Department of Defense interest in the shuttle was also an important factor in how time 
and funding within NASA was allocated throughout the 1970’s and 80’s. Hubble was developed 
from the beginning to be dependent on the shuttle, and the shuttle was dependent on the 
military’s need to deploy similarly large, complex, and expensive classified satellites.  Many 
military reconnaissance missions, including the launch and deployment of the massive KH-11 
and KH-12 “keyhole” spy satellites which were “capable of reading license plates in the 
Kremlin,”80 were developed as the Hubble was to be heavily reliant on manned space shuttle 
missions. A 1984 article in the New York Times argued that 
The history of the American space program is replete with tension between those who 
would preserve space as a frontier for scientific exploration and those who would seize it 
as a soldier's ultimate high ground. But the shuttle project has gradually left the National 
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Aeronautics and Space Administration a junior partner to the Defense Department in 
budgetary, technological and political strength. 81 
 
Without the military interest in the shuttle as a way of deploying defense related satellites, 
establishing a military astronaut presence, and generally enabling U.S. national security interests 
from space, NASA would not have received the same level of executive and military support for 
the shuttle program.82  
Image 6: U.S. Space Budget, 1971-1990.                                                                                                               
Source: Office of Management and Budget, “Aeronautics and Space Report to the President,” 1989. 
President Reagan’s plan to pursue the Strategic Defense Initiative further emphasized the 
military’s role in space and the military’s appropriation of the budget, 
By the early 1980's, moreover, the Pentagon's space budget had overtaken NASA's space 
budget. According to G.A.O. [Government Accountability Office] analyses, the Defense 
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Department's 1983 budget for space projects totaled $8.5 billion in unclassified funding, 
of which $581 million was related to the shuttle. NASA's entire budget request for the 
fiscal year 1983, by comparison, was $6.6 billion, of which $3.4 billion went to the 
shuttle.83 
 
Although never fully proven to be within the realm of scientific possibility and criticized as a 
reckless political maneuver, the Strategic Defense Initiative nevertheless consumed billions of 
federal dollars throughout the final decade of the Cold War. 84  Although the military and civil 
aerospace programs were hypothetically intended to be mutually beneficial to each other in terms 
of shared technological knowledge, the relationship was often unbalanced to NASA’s detriment. 
Hubble experienced problems with its solar arrays prior to the first 1993 servicing mission, and 
Chaisson asserted that 
The military, long aware of the adverse effects of the flimsy lightweight arrays, had 
redesigned them to be more robust and compact, above all less susceptible to jitter. And, 
once again, they were apparently unwilling or unable to tell the civilian-based Hubble 
project…Sometimes I think the intelligencers were trying to make NASA look not just 
bad but foolish.85 
 
Solar panels were likely not the only valuable technological asset which essentially “sat on a 
shelf at Lockheed…because they “officially” did not exist.”86 Although it is difficult to assess 
the extent to which the military may have paralleled or surpassed Hubble and other civilian 
technology, the growth of appropriations for defense related aerospace development quickly 
began to surpass that of the civilian program.  
Whatever the size of the budget, the ability of both civil and military elements of the 
space program to stay within their fiscal guidelines was made increasingly difficult with every 
failure or delay. $4 billion was spent at Vandenberg Air Force base in California to establish a 
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west coast shuttle launch 
facility “designed to place 
clandestine military 
satellites into orbit.”87 The 
shuttle was initially 
intended to be the 
exclusive launch vehicle 
for high priority military 
missions, however, the 
dependability of the space 
shuttle was immediately 
called into question after 
the Challenger tragedy and ultimately no space shuttles ever launched from Vandenberg. 
Following Challenger, subsequent shuttle schedule delays, as well as Titan and Delta launch 
failures in 1986, the military’s capability to launch defense related payloads was put under 
significant stress.88 As a result, in the years following Challenger, military missions took priority 
over scientific and commercial projects and consistently accounted for a significant portion of 
shuttle payloads.89  
Public detachment from the space program and mistrust in NASA reached a peak after 
the widely viewed Challenger disaster in 1986. “People I’ve talked to today compare it to the 
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day Kennedy was shot,” said a Houstonian interviewed the day of the tragedy.90 The American 
public was dealt a devastating blow when President Kennedy was assassinated, although the 
hope and idealism he inspired lived on in part through his political successors. Still considered a 
father of the space program, Kennedy’s goals were cited by President Johnson throughout his 
tenure in order to bolster support for the Apollo program. Although the space shuttle flew for 
many more years following the Challenger disaster, the program never met the original 
expectations or fully recaptured the imagination of the American public. 
The O-ring failure which ultimately caused the Challenger explosion was found to have 
been entirely preventable in hindsight, much like the electrical and mechanical issues which led 
to the Apollo I tragedy in 1967. Although the deaths of the Apollo astronauts were redeemed at 
least in part by the moon landing two years later, the deaths of the Challenger (and Columbia) 
astronauts remain a testament to the disappointment and tragedy of the space shuttle program. 
Although President Reagan’s speech following the incident was a powerful invocation of the 
pioneering spirit of the American space program which harkened back to the Apollo era, a 
newspaper article published the day following Challenger illustrated the profoundly different 
affect this tragedy had on the American public: 
The sense of national catastrophe is inevitably heightened in a television age, when the 
whole country participates in it. A first hint of the power of the electronic media to bring 
disaster directly into the living rooms came with the radio broadcast of the explosion of 
the zeppelin Hindenburg in 1937; but that was nothing compared with the pictures this 
morning of the space shuttle exploding, disintegrating and etching chaotic, sickening 
contrails against the blue sky.91 
 
The continuing effect that Challenger had on the space program and on the public cannot be 
overstated. In an article reflecting on the end of the space shuttle program 25 years later in 2011, 
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it was still remembered that “Buck Roger’s dreams died that day” and “they died a second death 
on February 1st, 2003, when the Columbia broke apart on re-entry.” 92  
Although the Rogers Commission Report into the Challenger disaster was able to define 
the incident as the result of an O-ring failure and flawed management decisions at NASA, it was 
less successful in enumerating the combination of historically rooted technical, bureaucratic, and 
political decisions and actions which likely contributed to the eventual physical failure which 
occurred on the launch pad.93 Additionally, as the 1986 New York Times article above 
illustrates, the advent of other technologies especially that of mass visual media made the event 
exponentially more impactful than aerospace tragedies of the past. It was difficult to assess in a 
report how the accumulation of interactions within the space shuttle’s vast developmental 
network influenced the Challenger failure, however, after Columbia was destroyed in 2003 many 
blamed the failure of the Rogers Commission in the 1980’s to adequately identify and respond to 
the systemic issues behind the tragedy. The investigators into the Columbia disaster made 
definitive efforts to delve deeper into the underlying issues which resulted in the tragedy, 
including the culture of inadequate risk assessment in the space program, the “politicization” of 
NASA, and “strict budget limits” imposed simultaneously with grandiose program proposals.94  
Originally touted as a “space bus” which could fly 50-60 flights per year, the space 
shuttle flew successfully 132 times over the 30 year span of the program.95 The question of risk 
undoubtedly arose as Hubble was developed to work in coordination with the space shuttle, the 
only orbiting telescope to do so. Eric Chaisson asked of Hubble’s deployment: “Why would our 
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technological society risk astronauts’ precious lives to launch and deploy a robot that could 
otherwise have been lifted more cheaply and more effectively into orbit by means of an 
unmanned, expendable rocket?”96 This and other questions unfortunately have come to define 
the very ambiguous legacy of the space shuttle. 
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Chapter 4: “The Trouble with Hubble”97  
Originally intended to be launched as 
early as 1986, Hubble experienced delays 
along with the rest of the space program. 
The space shuttle Discovery launched 
Hubble into orbit in April of 1990 and it 
was at the time the largest and most 
complex civilian scientific instrument to utilize the space shuttle’s generous cargo bay. 
Unfortunately, soon after deployment a spherical aberration in the primary mirror of Hubble was 
revealed much to the consternation of politicians, the public, and all who had developed Hubble 
over the past several decades. The Hubble optical flaw was eventually determined to be 
primarily the fault of contractor Perkin-Elmer.98 In short, Perkin-Elmer polished the primary 
mirror too flat which distorted the telescope’s ability to focus and resulted in blurry images. 
Although the spherical aberration itself may have been identified as a single physical error, it 
likely resulted from a compounding of interconnected issues. Whatever the cost oversights, 
management issues, inaccurate calculations, and regulation failures which contributed to the 
Hubble flaw, the popular reaction to it was amplified by other issues within the space program. 
To many politicians, Hubble was not a solitary event but rather a representation of long term 
failures within the national space program. 
 In the Hubble Space Telescope Flaw hearing before the Committee on Science, Space, 
and Technology in 1990, the Democratic Chairmen Robert Roe began with a call for his fellow 
politicians to recognize the role congressional appropriations play in civil space programs: 
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For years, Congress, in the fatality of its policies, has been nickel and diming NASA, and 
I think that has had a consequence. The decision not to fully test the mirrors was made in 
large part for budgetary reasons. I think it is high time that Congress realized that large, 
costly projects cannot be run on a shoestring, and they can’t be just be run from 
appropriation to appropriation.99 
 
Chairmen Roe advocated for “self-examination” by Congress, however many of his peers argued 
for an examination of NASA’s managerial abilities, NASA’s efficient use of allocations, the 
quality of contracted work, and the relative value of scientific data and the Hubble program. 
Although the Hubble flaw drew into question the network of agencies and scientists which had 
contributed to Hubble’s development, NASA’s status as a network translator in many ways 
protected these other elements from blame.  
Image 9: Simplified Hubble Organizational Structure and Project Responsibilities.                                       
Source: Smith, The Space Telescope, 227. 
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NASA’s role as the representative for Hubble meant that Hubble’s performance in turn 
represented NASA and the space program more than anything else. To most politicians, the 
media, and the public, the role of Perkin-Elmer or of Lockheed mattered very little compared to 
the implications of a potentially unfixable flaw not just on Hubble but in the national space 
program. Callon wrote that “the translator expresses their desires, their secret thoughts, their 
interests, their mechanisms of operation…for what is true for human entities, whether they be 
collective or individual, is also true for the other elements that constitute an actor-world.”100 
NASA’s cultural history is ingrained with notions of space spectaculars and American 
exceptionalism, and therefore Hubble was advertised in such a way which reflected these 
aggrandized standards. Rather than be represented to the public in a way which would highlight 
the complexity and power as well as the riskiness and vulnerability, NASA endorsed Hubble as 
something which would make groundbreaking discoveries about the nature of the universe and 
be a monument to human scientific progress. Although this may have been true in the long run, 
NASA misrepresented the multi-faceted nature of Hubble and damaged its own reputation in the 
long term.  The high level of criticism encountered by NASA is in many ways characteristic of 
big science and the incredible difficulty inherent in translating a scientific program which 
encompasses multitudes of technical, political, and economic networks. 
In response to the dramatic public and political reaction to the flaw, Chaisson argued that 
“honest and open appraisals of Hubble’s commissioning problems might have resulted in a more 
balanced discussion of the aberration issue and of its possible solutions.”101 He goes on to argue 
that the way in which NASA dealt with or represented Hubble’s flaw only exacerbated the 
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situation to their detriment. Chaisson described a 1990 press conference in which NASA 
addresses the aberration: 
In their opening remarks, the emotionally drained officials immediately moved to raise 
the ante, even before Hubble’s ills were explained clearly, by announcing that NASA was 
impounding the relevant design records, data logs, and polishing machines of Hughes 
Danbury and was convening a formal Board of Inquiry to investigate the origin of the 
mistake—all of which had the effect of transforming a technical problem into a social 
crisis…The prospect that there would, after all, be no pictures from Hubble hit the media 
hard; they had become wrapped up in this science project like no other in history.102 
 
The media and the public were likely wrapped up not only in the idea of pictures from Hubble 
but in the idea of big science living up to expectations and reinvigorating a stumbling national 
space program. Upon the announcement of Hubble’s flaw it was not enough for the civil space 
agency to plan for a fix or promise to investigate the root causes of the problem. “The space 
agency was about to undergo a ‘NASA-bashing’ the likes of which it had not experienced.”103 
Congress attempted to shift blame between budgetary, cultural, and technical elements of 
NASA’s structure in order to explain how such an advanced and seemingly elite program could 
fall victim to what scientists considered a relatively simple surface flaw on an otherwise fully 
functioning instrument, and what politicians considered a multi-billion dollar catastrophe. 
George Brown Jr., a liberal Democrat, expressed his agreement with Roe on NASA’s budgetary 
constraints, connecting it explicitly to the space shuttle failures in the process: 
Hubble may yet be another example of what happens when we run highly complex 
research and development programs on tight-fisted budgets. As with the space shuttle 
Challenger accident, we may have been penny wise and pound foolish. Though some 
may want to point the finger at NASA failing to require an end-to-end test of the Hubble 
space telescope optical system, NASA may have been constrained by budgetary pressures 
to keep the cost of the program low…Instead of causing us to point fingers, Hubble’s 
troubles should prompt a constructive and necessary debate on how exciting space 
exploration projects we now envision can be carried out without repeating the mistakes of 
the past.104 
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More than other incidents, the loss of space shuttle Challenger initiated not only investigations 
into NASA but also introspection by politicians about the standing of the space program.  
The national space program was and is subject to the assessments made by politicians as 
to whether or not certain programs do enough “good” for American people to justify annual 
budget allocations. Ideas of what is and is not “good” invariably varies greatly between different 
politicians and different scientists, but the Challenger tragedy left an indelible mark in the minds 
of everyone who witnessed it and had consequences that reverberated throughout the entire 
program. Challenger made possible the idea that the successful space program of the 1960’s was 
an anomaly, and put simply, many politicians and much of the public ceased to believe in NASA 
or the space program’s ability to return to Apollo-era levels of success. Throughout the Cold 
War, the space shuttle had deployed many covert satellites for the DOD at incredible costs and 
with varying levels of success. However, as a civilian instrument in the post-Cold War era, 
Hubble was left open for public criticism and became easy prey upon which politicians and the 
media could project broad critiques of NASA. The difficulty of communicating the different 
perspectives of NASA officials, scientists, and politicians to each other is evident throughout 
congressional transcripts addressing NASA budget allocations and issues relating to the Hubble 
and the Shuttle. 
Astronomers throughout the world waited in line to utilize Hubble for scientific 
knowledge inaccessible from ground-based telescopes, but the search for astrophysical data was 
hardly enough justification for most politicians. The primary way in which politicians justified 
Hubble to taxpayers, and many big science programs, was to emphasize the growth of jobs. The 
aerospace industry, scientific and academic institutes, technical and manufacturing industries, 
and government jobs through NASA were expected to be positively impacted by Hubble and 
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other large space programs. Research conducted in the early 1970’s concluded that for every 
dollar NASA spends on research and development, seven dollars are returned to the US gross 
national product.105 This is a statistic which has been strongly promoted by NASA and although 
the positive economic impacts of government sponsored aerospace R&D spending have been 
confirmed by several other studies, 106 their accuracy remains somewhat arguable in part due to 
the difficulty in assessing the long term impact of private contracts and the “trickle-down” value 
of NASA’s “spin-off” technologies.107 It has been a consistent trend, however, that states with 
NASA centers and headquarters receive significantly more economic stimulus and job growth. 
These include Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland, Michoud Assembly Facility in 
Louisiana, Marshall Space Flight Center in Alabama, Ames Research Center and Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory among others in California, Kennedy Space Center in Florida, and Johnson Space 
Center in Texas. These states have in the past received the lion’s share of NASA resources and 
funding, however, in more recent years changes in NASA’s programming structure (for instance, 
SBIR/STTR or the Small Business Innovation Research/Small Business Technology Transfer 
Program) has facilitated private aerospace expenditures in states such as Colorado which, as of 
2012, has the second largest aerospace economy behind California.108 
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Barbara Mikulski, a democratic senator from Maryland since 1987, participated in a 1991 
senate hearing on the many problems at NASA, including Hubble, the Space Shuttle, and Space 
Station Freedom. She described herself as a “space Senator” in which she acknowledged her 
state’s link to the space program through the Goddard Space Flight Center and the Space 
Telescope Institute at Johns Hopkins, in addition to her longstanding support for the “values and 
ideals and goals” of the civilian space program. Goddard controls use of the instruments on 
board Hubble and manages development of its future successor, the James Webb Space 
Telescope. In the 1990’s Goddard employed around 13,000 people, of which more than half 
were scientists and engineers. Goddard had a budget of approximately $2 Billion per year in the 
1990’s, of which “commercial firms received 60%, educational institutions received 28%, non-
profit organizations received 8%, other government agencies received 3%, and 1 % was awarded 
outside the U.S.”109 Despite her apparent ideological as well as political and economic 
commitment to the space program, she describes the “serious flaw in Hubble’s primary mirror” 
as a “devastating blow to NASA” which “sums up the history of the spectacular space-based 
project: cost overruns, NASA and contractor mismanagement, and the frequent absence of 
quality control.”110 Mikulski argued NASA’s large “spectacular” projects had become victims of 
systemic issues.  
The congressional discussion of NASA problems is illustrative of discursive differences 
between individuals at NASA such as scientists who are directly involved in the technical 
aspects of the space program, and politicians and media entities which are not. In the 1990 
congressional hearing on the Hubble flaw, NASA administrator Admiral Richard Truly 
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described the spherical aberration as an “error in the curvature of the mirror…which was to be 
smooth within about 1/50th of one wavelength of light at a particular frequency,” he went on to 
say that “it appears that a likely candidate [for the cause of the flaw] was a simple error made in 
the manufacture of the primary mirror.” The use of the word “simple” was then interrogated by 
congressman Roe:  
I think that some clarification has to be made, if I may. Number one, we use the word 
“simplicity,” and I think you’re using it in the technical term, not simplicity in the order 
of magnitude of the problem we’re faced with. I mean, it’s not a simple problem by any 
stretch of the imagination to correct something that’s been manufactured incorrectly. 
 
To Roe, the magnitude of the issue was more accurately measured by the expense and the level 
of negative public reaction to the flaw. Roe went on to have this one-sided exchange with 
Lennard Fiske, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Space Science: 
Roe: Where I’m coming from, it seems to me that the first and foremost issue in the 
minds of myself and, I think, most of the members and the people of this country, is this 
thing a dud? I have to bring it down to that simplicity. Is it a dud? 
Fisk: It isn’t… 
Roe: Let me finish. The question is not complete. I want to just let that sink in. Is it a 
dud? That’s number one. Did we spend a billion and a half or more dollars and build a 
telescope that, according to some of the press, doesn’t produce what it was supposed to 
produce? And can never produce what it was supposed to produce, according to some of 
the articles I have read. Should we have spent this kind of money and all of the problems 
and frustrations of this Hubble over the period of time, or did we waste the money? 111 
 
The NASA administrators went on to describe the flaw as something fixable, and the HST as an 
instrument which would still achieve essentially all the scientific goals that it set out to achieve.  
 For Roe and his colleagues, the Hubble flaw took on a greater magnitude in part because 
of their reliance on popular news media to understand the extent of the issue, as well as the 
constant reminder of “what we went through four years ago after the Challenger.”112 Scheuer, 
and other politicians, went on to ask “how could the science fail?” In this instance the Hubble 
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flaw was not perceived as a result of systemic issues at NASA or in Congress, but as a 
representation of the unthinkable failure of American “Science” to live up to an aggrandized 
standard of scientific infallibility and idealized cultural memories. For Hubble to represent 
American Science as a whole, even symbolically, reflects on the profound alienation between the 
technical-scientific community and everyone else. Rather than be understood for its 
embeddedness within the military, industrial, and civilian science programs and the enormity of 
its data gathering capacities, Hubble was briefly nothing more than a myopic reminder of 
American failure to live up to American expectations of “space spectaculars” past.  
Republican Senator Edwin Garn, who flew in space as a Payload Specialist on space 
shuttle Discovery, argued that media outlets and “some politicians” had inaccurately and unfairly 
taken NASA’s technical problems and used them as a way to disparage the entire program while 
ignoring a long record of successes. In the 1991 congressional hearing Garn stated: “The real test 
of agency competence is how these issues are addressed and resolved… I see the press out there 
as a bunch of piranha and some of my colleagues as the same…who seem to enjoy kicking 
someone when they are down…”113 Garn’s unique position as both a politician and an astronaut 
undoubtedly influenced his emphatic defense of NASA to congress: 
I am sorry to take so much time, but it disturbs me. As one who has been inside NASA. It 
still has the most technically competent, capable people of any Government agency, and 
the most dedicated astronauts, the cream of the crop of America’s scientists, pilots, and 
administrators. There is not another agency that compares. But we are going to kick them 
when they are down and we are going to take isolated events and bring them 
together…Yet the press has to say, oh, we’ve got Hubble, we’ve got the shuttle, and 
we’ve got these astronauts and all these problems, like they are just groping and looking, 
finding every little tidbit to make the agency look bad. Well, this Senator resents that. I 
would like to take some of those people with me. I would like to have them spend some 
time down there and see how these people work, all throughout NASA, the cast of 
thousands that makes a mission possible, not just for the astronauts. Then I would like to 
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take some of the gutless wonders out there on a space shuttle trip, if they had the nerve to 
go. I would probably need some big diapers, however, to take care of their problems. 114 
 
The passionate, and probably offensive to some, way in which Senator Garn argued his point 
reflects on the powerful and deeply personal way in which the culture of the space program can 
impact the fundamental value systems of those integrated into it. Astronaut Gus Grissom is 
quoted in the years before his 1967 death in the Apollo 1 fire: “If we die, we want people to 
accept it. We’re in a risky business, and we hope that if anything happens to us it will not delay 
the program. The conquest of space is worth the risk of life.”115 That sentiment is echoed by 
many astronauts, scientists, and space enthusiasts, including NASA administrator, Admiral 
Richard Truly while addressing congress in 1991: “When you run complex programs that are run 
by human beings, failures and anomalies are going to happen. Space flight is a risky business. 
This country does not print enough money to take all the risk out of it. But it is worth doing.”116  
The role of “space spectaculars” was important in the arguments of both Senators 
Mikulski and Garn. While productive scientific data may be produced at NASA and other 
institutions on a daily basis, those discoveries are limited to the few, the scientists, who have the 
comprehension to appreciate those discoveries and the communities to interpret them. Space 
spectaculars are determined by their accessibility to the public and to non-scientists in general. 
When things such as the moon landing or the launch of Sputnik occurred, whether good or bad, 
they overwhelmed the rest of the space program. Senator Garn addressed this phenomena: 
When you consider such a relatively brief period of time, from the late 1950’s, not having 
the ability to fly anything in space –and we experience this with the Challenger accident. 
Nobody talked about the fact that 52 manned missions were successfully completed in 
space without one fatal accident. They concentrated on the Challenger accident.117 
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The early Cold War emphasis on prestige set the precedent for space spectaculars to play a key 
role in the national space program. The enduring popular legacy of the moon landing was not 
that everyone learned all about what moon rocks were made of, but that an American man 
planted an American flag on another celestial body and everyone got to watch it on TV. The 
Apollo program was one of the first examples of big science in the United States, although the 
vastness of the program is often reduced in popular culture to Neil Armstrong’s single misquoted 
line. The Cold War propaganda as it was aligned with the Apollo program helped to establish 
NASA’s position in American popular culture and all of the heightened expectations that went 
along with that. NASA’s popular and cultural significance would likely have been drastically 
altered had the Apollo program been less successful.  
Although the mid-century propagation of the heroic astronaut image was positive in the 
sense that it increased awareness and popularity of the space program, it also set the standards 
for success very high and mythologized the science behind NASA programs. The popular 
expectations of visually exciting and emotionally impactful space spectaculars limited the ability 
of otherwise scientifically important programs to gain the recognition and support they may have 
needed to succeed. Although media outlets, politicians, and different groups often critique the 
big science programs when they go wrong, they somewhat paradoxically expect the space 
program to mimic the past and recapture their imagination through spectacular programs which 
can only really be accomplished on a massive scale, over many years, and with the involvement 
of thousands of individuals, agencies, and entities.  
In the early 1960’s big science was already subject to criticisms. Allen Weinberg 
questioned whether science would be ruined by the injection of too much money into 
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bureaucracies which would then make big science “fat and lazy.”118 These fears remained very 
relevant in the 1990’s and the issue remained somewhat polarizing for scientists and non-
scientists alike. “The Federal Government has embarked on the most ambitious array of big 
science projects ever, with some experts saying they herald a new age of discovery while others 
are warning that their great cost could cripple vital parts of the nation's scientific effort and 
eventually the American economy.”119 A 1990 article in the New York Times enumerated many 
criticisms of big science: 
''Big science has gone berserk,'' said Dr. Rustum Roy, professor of materials science at 
Pennsylvania State University, who is an adviser to the House Committee on Science. 
''Good minds and a lot of money are going into areas that are not relevant to American 
competitiveness, American technological health, or even the balanced development of 
American science.'' …''We have a crisis developing,'' said Representative George E. 
Brown Jr., a California Democrat who has served on the House science committee for 
nearly a quarter century. ''We're freezing out a lot of our good work because of the 
commitment to big science.'' In dealing with inevitable costs rises, [Frederick N. 
Khedouri, a budget official in the Reagan White House who oversaw most of the nation's 
big-science projects] said, managers at Federal agencies often ''sacrifice less visible but 
probably more important programs.'' The overall effect, he said, ''is a system in which bad 
science tends to drive out the good.'' 120 
 
Big science was perceived in some ways to be at odds with the “nature” of science and at odds 
with “good” science. Although the many critiques of big science were valid in many ways, they 
were also imbued with the idea that “the science” should always perform according to certain 
beneficent expectations.  
The way in which people perceive the relative morality of science is rooted in socio-
political historical contexts which constructed an idea of scientific purity, scientific might, and 
determined a particular trajectory for large scientific endeavors. Many critiques of big science 
fail to mention the impact that the military and the quest for American dominance in space has 
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had on large scientific endeavors in the United States and elsewhere. The role of politics and the 
military in shaping science can often be blatantly ignored or unseen by media outlets and others 
because of the flawed socio-cultural construction of “Science” as something that should 
unquestionably be a positive force. The same 1990 newspaper article which enumerated the 
flaws throughout big civil science argued that: 
Experts have no formal definition of ''big science,'' but for the purposes of this article it is 
seen as any civilian research project whose construction costs are $100 million or more. 
This definition excludes military endeavors like the Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star 
Wars, on which more than $20 billion has been spent so far, and high-technology 
development programs like the proposed $5 billion aerospace plane that would fly off a 
runway into earth orbit. Such programs can have much the same impact in siphoning off 
money and technical talent from other worthy projects, but they are not usually 
considered scientific in nature.121  
 
It would seem blaringly contradictory that simply because programs operate under military 
auspices and without civil oversight that they would not be considered “scientific in nature.” 
Although the Strategic Defense Initiative in particular was not based on verifiable or realistic 
science, the extensive nature of the military’s scientific endeavors and the military’s role in 
enabling big science is virtually unarguable. The inaccessibility of military science because of its 
often classified status can have negative impacts on the civil agency, NASA, which is forced to 
represent the whole of science programs which are only fractionally determined by civilian 
directives. While the loss of Challenger was a blow to the budget and efficiency of the Defense 
Department, it was NASA’s reputation and the reputation of the civilian space program which 
was irreparably damaged. Similarly in the case of Hubble’s flaw, politicians and the media found 
little prerogative to look beyond NASA for the causes of the error.  
An article published by science writer Dennis Overbye three years later on the eve of 
STS-61, Hubble’s first repair mission, described Hubble as an idea “cooked up” by Lyman 
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Spitzer, subject to the “spinmasters” at NASA, and “a relic of a time when NASA thought 
humans could do anything and everything in space.”122 The article goes on to speak for NASA as 
if it was, again, the only entity responsible for space science and the only entity responsible for 
the trajectory of the United States space program:  
The space agency itself likes to view the Hubble repair as evidence of a new NASA -- or 
of the good old NASA returned. But optimistic rhetoric cannot disguise the fact that 
NASA has foundered for a mission ever since it beat the Russians to the moon. With the 
Cold War over, the public appetite for ambitious scientific projects has diminished. And 
NASA offers no new dream to lift us, or itself. The proposed international space station 
and Mission to Planet Earth may be responsible public works projects, but they are hardly 
stirring. To save the world -- or at least regain its own technological edge -- NASA needs 
an inspiration, and the universe is waiting.  
 
Overbye inferred, whether intentionally or not, that NASA has been impacted by the military. A 
civilian agency, after all, would not have been concerned with “beating” anyone to anywhere. He 
claimed it was the end of the Cold War which satiated the “public’s” appetite for ambitious 
scientific projects, a statement which also ignored the role of the military in determining “public” 
projects. It would also seem plausible that the public’s passion for the space program was slowly 
diminished well before the fall of the Soviet Union because of the military’s heavy hand in 
determining the course of the program. Perhaps it was and is true that NASA is often left 
“floundering” for a mission in the absence of overt military need and it is by definition, easier to 
identify the flaws of a civilian program than the flaws of a covert militant program. However, the 
very critiques that Overbye leveled against NASA speak to the underlying role that NASA has 
always played in the American cultural imagination despite its military duality. Overbye argued 
that somehow NASA is capable of “saving the world” if only it offered a “new dream to lift us.” 
The idea that NASA, despite all of its flaws, could somehow still be capable of uplifting an 
entire society illustrates the profound power and impact that the successful space science 
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programs have had on American culture and the American psyche. The hope and inspiration that 
NASA has come to represent for many people make it equally catastrophic to the sense of 
American exceptionalism when NASA or “American science” is perceived to have failed.123  
The Hubble mirror flaw was especially emphatic because it was visible to the public 
through tangible (and blurry) images of space. The flaw was a material manifestation of the 
perceived inadequacies and inefficiencies of private contractors, astronomers, NASA, and public 
officials. Senator Garn argued, however, that if 
Hubble were sending back beautiful pictures nobody would be questioning NASA 
management…You can shake up NASA management every day of the week. You can 
turn it upside down… You can change Congress. And that would not have prevented the 
technical tragedy that has taken place because of the lack of some proper tests 10 years 
ago.124  
 
Fortunately for the reputation of NASA and all involved in the Hubble program, Garn’s 
statement regarding the popularization of Hubble photographs certainly rang true in the long 
term. His argument raised the question of the logic and necessity of assigning blame for an event 
such as the Hubble flaw. Perkin-Elmer was the contractor in charge of polishing the primary 
mirror in the 1980’s as Garn pointed out, however the development and construction of a 
program as complex as the HST involved the interaction of an almost innumerable number of 
factors over several decades, making the identification of the one “true” reason behind the flaw a 
daunting if not somewhat unrealistic task.  
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Chapter 5: Disillusionment and the Move Towards Commercialization 
The American space program was initially built upon the ideological conflict and military 
buildup between the United States and Russia. In the context of the Cold War, technological 
failures in space and on the ground could be validated in part by the necessity to further 
American exceptionalism in the world no matter what the cost. After several years of recession 
and “stagflation” in the 1970’s during the Nixon and Carter presidencies, President Reagan 
campaigned on a platform of reduced government spending, de-regulation, and supply-side 
economics which ultimately shifted the space program budget in favor of military 
appropriation.125 This shift perpetuated the dominance of wartime prestige-driven science 
spending over other scientific or academically based civil space programs.  
Although it could be argued that NASA lost course soon after the success of the moon 
landing, the space program was under increased pressure to prove its value in the early 1990’s 
after the end of the Cold War and in the wake of Challenger.  Manned space flight had been 
emphasized throughout the space program because it “served a valuable prestige purpose during 
the space race” and could more easily garner political support, however the de-emphasis on 
technological dominance and status in space after the end of the Cold War in 1991 meant 
scientifically driven programs would have to come to the forefront of the space program in favor 
of space spectaculars.126 The end of the Cold War marked the end of legitimate justification for a 
space program based heavily on missions with mass appeal or covert military imperatives, like 
the space shuttle. Chief historian at NASA, Roger Launius argued that the “prestige trap” of the 
space race era resulted in misguided directives within the space program from very early on:  
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No one intended to be boxed into a particular approach to space activities, but over time 
NASA’s policy options have been narrowed by its long history with this aspect of the 
space enterprise. Despite changing national priorities, evolving international situations, 
emerging political positions, and advancing technologies in robotics and electronics that 
might otherwise prompt major shifts in policy and mission, NASA has clung to the 
human spaceflight model advanced at the height of the Cold War when prestige vis-a`-vis 
the Soviet Union prompted emphasis on this human dimension. As the Cold War ended, 
however, this rationale has lessened in its hold over the nation and NASA has been cast 
adrift in its justifications for human spaceflight.127  
 
The end of the space shuttle program and the gradual move away from Hubble towards its 
potential successors represents in some ways the end of an era for the national space program. 
Hubble’s development throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s was often sidelined by the shuttle and 
by other military satellite programs. Upon its launch in the 1990’s, however, in the brief absence 
of war and the weakened state of the manned space program, the entire civilian space program 
and NASA had a heightened stake in Hubble’s success. The compounding economic, political, 
and cultural effects of the space shuttle events, Hubble’s flaw, and other issues in the program 
highlight the ability of technology to “shape a variety of social processes, sometimes according 
to human plans, but just as often not, or at least not quite.”128 The large networks of scientists, 
administrators, and agencies which facilitated scientific development in the space program were 
also contingent on the technology itself. The impact of Hubble’s initial flaw combined with the 
disasters of the shuttle program were enough to call into question the government’s ability to 
adequately, efficiently, and safely conduct big science in space. 
 The issues which have taken place in the last 30 years of the space program have also 
played a significant role in diminishing the American pride in the space program which 
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characterized the Apollo era. Addressing the end of the shuttle program in 2011, a New York 
Times article lamented:  
As the centerpiece of our country’s gaudily ambitious space adventures, the shuttle 
program was a pre-eminent symbol of our belief that there were literally no limits to 
where we could go and no boundaries to what we could accomplish, so long as we 
hitched our ingenuity to our imagination and marshaled the requisite will. And there’s no 
real sense of what big dreams, if any, lie beyond Atlantis. The program’s end carries the 
force of cruel metaphor, coming at a time when limits are all we talk about. When we 
have no stars in our eyes… 
Americans right now are profoundly doubtful. Shaken. For many, the fear isn’t just that 
there’s no imminent end to high unemployment and tepid economic growth, but that 
we’ve turned a fundamental corner and our best days really are behind us…Despite the 
president’s exhortation that we chart the frontiers of innovation, there’s no grand mission 
that represents the kind of storehouse for our confidence and emblem of our can-do spirit 
that space exploration once did.129 
Despite the programs tragedies and inefficiencies, it would seem that Americans still wanted to 
believe in not only the shuttle program, but in the possibility of American human space flight 
and space science in general. The early success of Apollo and the cultural imprint of the moon 
landing provided, in the long run, more consistent support for the American space program than 
any political or economic reasoning could. However, the nostalgia of the midcentury space 
program can only subsist for so long. Although the national space program as it is represented by 
NASA does and will likely always play an important role in providing direction and leadership 
to American ventures into space, the space program finds itself in a somewhat transitional period 
in response to weakened socio-political funding and support as well as indistinct mission 
directives. 
James Sensenbrenner, a conservative congressman, argued in the early 1990’s that the 
Hubble flaw suggested “serious deficiencies in NASA’s ability to estimate costs and to monitor 
contracts and an organizational attitude which places too low a priority on risk management, 
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testing, and verification. Perhaps these are all symptoms of NASA’s unwavering confidence and 
optimism to meet every challenge despite limited resources.”130 Sensenbrenner’s statement raises 
the question of what cultural role NASA would have filled if it did not attempt to meet 
challenges with confidence and optimism. Idealized and unrealistic as they may be in practice, 
NASA programs have long been defined from a cultural standpoint by President Kennedy’s 
famous 1962 statement that the United States should engage in space science programs “not 
because they are easy, but because they are hard.” The often quoted line has come not only to 
represent NASA but to represent American cultural ideals of leadership, ingenuity, and 
exceptionalism. President Reagan attempted to evoke the same ideals to a captive, if significantly 
less enthusiastic, audience in 1986 when he contended that “it’s all part of taking a chance and 
expanding man’s horizons. The future doesn’t belong to the fainthearted; it belongs to the 
brave.”131  
The different views of politicians who had addressed the Hubble problem seemed to be 
influenced in part by the significance they placed on the Apollo program, their evaluation of its 
role in American history, and the level to which they feel it is necessary to continue supporting 
risky, technologically complex endeavors in space science. James Scheuer, a democratic 
congressman, described the Hubble flaw as “involving the hopes and expectations and the 
excitement of the entire American public.”132  It seems unlikely that discussions of the Hubble 
flaw would have been so polarized if they had not taken place in the context of the 1986 
Challenger tragedy and against the backdrop of the end of the Cold War. The different ways in 
which politicians, officials, and the media interpreted and allocated blame for the Hubble flaw 
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was used as a way in which they could express their own valuations of the space program in 
general.  
Although Hubble’s development was ingrained in the space race much like the space 
shuttle, Hubble also represented a necessary turn in NASA’s directives in which scientific 
missions needed to be prioritized over riskier endeavors which could potentially be left to 
commercial aerospace enterprise. NASA faced an uphill battle in proving the socio-political 
value of scientific unmanned missions and Hubble represented the perfect opportunity to do just 
that. The Hubble flaw and the idea of a multi-billion dollar “piece of junk uselessly orbiting the 
earth”, however, threatened to complete the disillusionment of an already traumatized public.133  
The political and public turmoil which existed because of the flawed HST in the early 
1990’s exhibited the extent of the detachment between the scientific community and everyone 
else. NASA, astronomers, and scientists who worked on the Hubble were part of a limited 
community of individuals who had an understanding of Hubble’s technology and of the data at 
stake. John Naugle, a former chief scientist at NASA, emphasized the need to eliminate barriers 
between seemingly elite scientific groups and the public: 
Scientists must recognize that where they are dependent upon public support for their 
endeavors, they must communicate the importance of their endeavors to the public – the 
knowledge they have gained and its significance. This enables the public to participate, in 
many cases vicariously, in these activities. If scientists devote perhaps one-tenth of the 
creative energy devoted to understanding the universe to explaining to the public the 
reasons for and importance of what they are doing, then I think the problems that we have 
in obtaining support for basic research will disappear.134 
 
In this case, Naugle argued in favor of the idea that there is a “knowledge deficit” existing 
primarily due to a flawed and under-prioritized educational system in the United States. Conflicts 
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between scientists, politicians, and the media, result in part from an imbalance in knowledge 
about the fundamental nature of the research being conducted. Some researchers have argued, 
however, that the mere spread of scientific knowledge is not enough to bolster support for 
scientific and technological endeavors.  
Political scientist Samuel Popkin and others have argued that public opinions on science 
and technology are often formed primarily by media biases and political framing more than any 
other factors. The concept of “low-information rationality” is based on “the assumption that 
human beings are cognitive misers and minimize the economic costs of making decisions and 
forming attitudes. Most citizens will therefore not bother to develop an in-depth understanding of 
scientific issues…”135 Dietram Scheufele of the Department of Life Sciences Communication at 
the University of Wisconsin argued that: 
Many of the academic debates about how citizens form attitudes about scientific issues 
come down to a conflict between ideals and realities. On one side, many of the recent 
public outreach efforts are based on somewhat idealistic views about a ‘scientific citizen’ 
who forms attitudes based on an in-depth understanding of scientific controversies, or 
should do. On the other, we have decades of research in social psychology, political 
science, and risk communication that suggests that knowledge plays a marginal role at 
best in shaping people’s opinions and attitudes about science and technology. In fact, 
many researchers have suggested that the way media present an issue, and people’s value 
systems and predispositions, play a much greater role in shaping citizens’ attitudes 
towards new technologies.136 
 
This idea critiques the “knowledge-deficit” model held by many advocates of popularizing 
science and suggests that scientists and other advocates should attempt to be more aware of the 
“cognitive shortcuts or heuristics” that people use to navigate the massive influx of information 
they consume on a daily basis.137 In this way it is necessary to acknowledge the role of political 
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framing in translating science to non-scientists. In this way, the political forces involved in 
NASA funding, program approval, and official appointments are of special importance to the 
perception and existence of the space program. Scheufele and Popkin’s argument of a “miserly” 
citizen may be considered a pessimistic take on human nature. However, it would also seem 
unrealistic to assume that the public can become adequately informed about huge network 
programs such as Hubble in an unbiased way in the absence of a widespread increase in 
government and corporate transparency in addition to a widespread improvement in access to 
scientific education. Both of these changes, while technically possible, are highly unlikely to 
occur in a useful timeframe to benefit the immediate scientific community or the public. 
Therefore, scientists and technological advocates must likely rely on a variety of different 
avenues to successfully promote the message and agenda of science to the public.  
Whether or not the public is receptive to the knowledge does not negate the fact that the 
scientific and social value of many technologically complex programs is often inadequately or 
insufficiently communicated to non-scientists, which strips away the real meaning of programs 
such as Hubble. A broadening spectrum of individuals have attempted to amend this prolific 
issue through mainstream or “popular science.” Making science palatable for the uninitiated is a 
complex task which few individuals have truly excelled at. In the field of space science, 
individuals such as Isaac Asimov, Carl Sagan, and Neil deGrasse Tyson have been notably 
successful in their attempts to interpret science, although not without difficulties. Not only is it 
difficult to interpret the scientific and technical complexities of scientific principles to the 
uninformed or uninterested, it is also difficult to align or make compatible the scientific message 
with other worldviews, spiritual and otherwise.  
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Like any relatively small group of people with a specific and unique set of goals, 
scientists run the risk of becoming alienated or detached from the mainstream. This separation 
comes in part from the depth of commitment held by scientists to the discovery of scientific 
truths and to the values of the scientific community. Even pro-space politicians often hold a very 
different perspective on space science than do the actual scientists involved. When asked to 
justify the millions of dollars spent on the Hubble repair mission, Astrophysicist Eric Chaisson 
focused on the ideals of “exploration,” “curiosity,” and “education,” whereas in response to the 
same question Senator Barbara Mikulski simply focused on “jobs.”138 The modern political 
climate is not as accepting of science for the sake of science as it was in the past for science in 
the name of American exceptionalism.  
Despite Hubble’s use as a civil scientific instrument in the early post-Cold War, it 
remained fundamentally embedded in the culture of a space program which had not yet evolved 
beyond its military beginnings or beyond the expectations lingering from the Apollo era. The 
Hubble program, like the space shuttle, was only as good as the sum of its parts. The foundations 
of the space program degraded throughout the latter half of the 20th century, not because of a 
lack of scientific need or ingenuity, but because of the increasingly questionable need for a 
military presence in space and an increasingly disenchanted public.  
 Programs such as Hubble would be impossible if not for the vastness of the resources 
committed to its organization, research, and development, however that level of complexity also 
distances the finished product from the networks which created it and from the public who 
ultimately stand in judgment. The enormity and complexity of the program, and many other large 
scientific programs, rendered it difficult if not impossible to be meaningfully represented to the 
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broader public. The Hubble Space Telescope is only one contemporary case of a big science 
program which was distilled into a single event and nearly defined by a single flaw.  
  Although it may be fair to say that most astronomers now largely hail Hubble and its 
subsequent repair as one of the most successful and important scientific endeavors of all time, 
not everyone in the scientific community felt so optimistically about the legacy of Hubble. 
Astrophysicist Eric Chaisson lamented that the 1993 Hubble repair was merely another way in 
which manned space spectaculars could steal the spotlight, and the support, for more 
scientifically productive programs. 
Much as the space shuttle program had cannibalized NASA’s science projects in the 
1970’s and 1980’s, government-sponsored space science would now once again take a 
back seat to crewed space flight, engineering demonstrations, and space spectaculars that 
excite the public to demand more space spectaculars. Even before we knew if any of the 
instruments installed by the STS-61 crew worked properly, the rallying cry within NASA 
had become, “Onward to the space station”—which to many of us scientists resembles an 
attempt to orbit a largely empty, hundred-billion-dollar garage in the sky.139 
 
Chaisson’s critique, while arguably justified, reflects on the “imperfect marriage” that was 
Hubble and the space shuttle. Hubble and other scientific civil programs may have been better 
off without the shuttle, and many would likely testify to that, however the five shuttle servicing 
missions to prolong the lifespan and productivity of Hubble proved both necessary and 
successful. Chaisson’s critique was written before Columbia occurred, which may account in 
part for his conviction that that space shuttle type programs would ultimately prevail over 
programs like Hubble. In some ways the opposite has occurred however, and Hubble is often 
considered the final redemptive note of the shuttle program which came to a relatively quiet end 
in 2011.  
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 The knowledge derived from Hubble observations has been 
transformative for astrophysics, astronomy, and Hubble’s post-
processed images have provided non-scientists with the first 
glimpses into deep space. An article in the New York Times 
painted a romanticized picture of the so called “Pillars of Creation” 
in the Eagle Nebula as it was first photographed by Hubble in 
1995. The article describes a “fantasyland of powerful cosmic 
forces…bathed in a flood of ultraviolet light from nearby young, 
hot stars, billowing columns of cold gas and dust rising ominously 
out of a dark molecular cloud like stalagmites from the floor of a 
cavern.”140 Although the impact of Hubble’s photography on the 
popular perception of space science has been immense and provided an important reprieve for 
NASA’s reputation, the science behind these images has also been incredibly productive. 
Engineer and historian Thomas Heppenheimer described Hubble’s early data:  
This was science at its best, raising deep issues at the foundations of astrophysics. It was 
not a simple matter of routine experiments and modestly improved findings. Rather, the 
Hubble Telescope was calling into question the basic methods of astronomy, casting 
doubt on what scientists truly know and how they claim to know it. Yet this telescope 
would stand at the forefront of work aimed at resolving this paradox, by sharpening the 
estimated age of the cosmos. 141 
 
One of Hubble’s most significant contributions has been the Deep Field and Ultra Deep Field 
images which located 13.2 billion year old galaxies, the oldest ever seen in the 13.7 billion year 
old visible universe. The Deep Field images were not simple snapshots, however, and required 
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the combination of a decade’s worth of photographs each exposed over the course of days.142 
The analysis of galaxy movement overtime demonstrated that the universe was expanding at 
faster rates, rather than being slowed by a central gravitational pull as formerly surmised. The 
Hubble Space Telescope has provided data that confirmed paradigm changing theories of 
universe expansion, provided evidence for the presence of dark energy, in addition to the 
discovery of numerous planets and stars in the 23 years it has been functioning. 
Image 11: Hubble Extreme Deep Field Detail, 2012.                                                                                           
Source: NASA, ESA, Illingworth, Magee, Oesch, Bouwens, HUD09. 
 Many of these discoveries would not have been possible without the installation of many 
improved scientific instruments developed for use on Hubble. All of the instruments currently 
operating on Hubble were built by Ball Aerospace with oversight by Goddard and the Space 
Telescope Institute, including the Wide Field Camera 3 and the Advanced Camera for Surveys 
which made the later Deep Field images possible.143 The national space program in the post-Cold 
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War era attempted to shift the culture and directives of NASA towards “smaller, cheaper, faster, 
better” missions under the auspices of then NASA administrator Daniel Goldin who succeeded 
Richard Truly in 1992.144 Goldin successfully oversaw several successful Hubble improvement 
missions, however his tenure was marred by the failure of several planetary probes.  
President Reagan moved towards increasing the marketable potential of space activities 
with the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 which recommended the increased use of 
private expendable launch vehicles in lieu of manned shuttle flights. Until the Challenger 
disaster in 1986, however, the government subsidization of the shuttle had made it a more 
attractive option than the Titan, Delta, or Atlas-Centaur rocket families which were built by 
Martin Marietta, McDonnell Douglas, and General Dynamics respectively.145 The rapid growth 
of the global communication satellite industry increased the demand and competition for 
efficient and reliable launching platforms and helped bolster Reagan’s free market agendas. 
American political leaders in the 1980’s embraced a free market ideology that placed a 
priority on limiting the size of the federal government. Right-wing ideologues questioned 
the government’s role (aside from the essential functions of defense) in American life. It 
was no longer obvious to them, or to their allies in Congress, that the federal government 
should provide lavish funding for basic research in science and technology. In an era of 
globalization, policymakers encouraged the development of scientific fields that could 
compete in the global marketplace as well as in the marketplace of ideas. These twin 
concerns—national defense and privatization—shaped the course of American policy for 
science and technology in the waning days of the Cold War.146 
 
The neoliberal political shift favoring deregulation and decreased government spending on 
science influenced the enactment of policies and programs which directly impacted NASA. For 
instance, The Commercial Space Act of 1998 “declares that free and competitive markets create 
the most efficient conditions for promoting economic development, and should therefore govern 
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the economic development of Earth orbital space.”147 The law argued that more widespread use 
of commercial resources would significantly reduce costs for the space program. Although 
NASA has formed contracts with a variety of smaller private firms, those contracts are often 
inconsistent and brief—unlike longstanding relationships with massive multi-national defense 
firms such as Lockheed and Boeing, which were both founded in the 1910’s and have been 
relatively constant actors in the aerospace industry ever since.  
Efforts to subsidize the private aerospace industry by NASA and congress have largely 
benefitted the same huge firms which were the most powerful economic and technological actors 
throughout space shuttle development and the early space program. The Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle Program (EELV) began in the early 1990’s and was intended to facilitate cheap 
and consistent satellite launch capabilities to replace older platforms. NASA’s EELV contract 
was initially a competition between Lockheed Martin and Boeing, however the two companies 
merged into the United Launch Alliance in 2005 which allowed them both to obtain the multi-
billion dollar contract. Lockheed Martin and Boeing have consistently been the top two 
contractors to NASA and are the largest defense contractors in the world, therefor the formation 
of the United Launch Alliance has been widely criticized as unfair market monopolization. 
United Launch Alliance has, however, received additional NASA contracts for heavy lift launch 
vehicles. Many smaller aerospace firms with competitive technologies, notably SpaceX and 
Orbital Sciences, have levied antitrust lawsuits against United Launch Alliance with no clear 
success.148 Some members of congress have also raised issues with the military and NASA’s 
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recent contractual decisions, questioning whether cheaper alternatives at smaller aerospace firms 
were being fairly considered.149 The political and military entrenchment of the space program 
has tied it almost inextricably to a few very powerful corporate entities which severely constrains 
the movement towards an idealized “free-market” for aerospace science.  
At the end of the Cold War heightened levels of economic competition and prioritization 
of debt reduction moved to outweigh military goals which had provided much of the backbone 
for federal science funding. As a result of these economic and political trends as well as “public 
disaffection with big science,” it became “more and more difficult for scientists to win grant 
support from government agencies, and those who were grant-funded faced greater oversight.”150 
Although corporations and private companies often provide different forms of grants and 
sponsorship to academic science and engineering, Wolfe argued that  
The new neoliberal consensus had succeeded in shifting American colleges and 
universities to private, rather than public support…academic scientists increasingly felt 
the pressure to focus their research on areas ripe for outside investment. Science, which 
had for so long had ridden the coattails of post-(WWII) American power, suddenly had to 
pay its own way.”151 
 
The need for science to “pay its own way” in a free market system presents a number of 
challenges for academic scientists, civil NASA programs, as well as smaller private aerospace 
companies.  
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John Kirton, professor of political science and international affairs at the University of 
Toronto, elaborates on some of the many vulnerabilities of the aerospace industry in the 
economic and political climate of the post-Cold War era: 
Entrepreneurs in the space sector face the full range of normal commercial risks… 
however, they also face extraordinary risks peculiar to their field. These come from the 
promise of high reward from a truly infinite frontier, the challenge of the enormous 
investment in capital, technology, and management, the suspense inherent in the high 
possibility of failure, and the drama of operating under the intense scrutiny of television 
cameras and of millions of viewers and the politicians who represent them…It is 
extremely dependent scientifically and technologically. It needs a constant stream of 
innovation and invention and perpetually faces the possibility that at least some 
breakthroughs will not come in time or in the expected direction. 
 
Moreover, space is often an exercise in ‘big project science,’ requiring many highly 
diverse inputs to come together in products that are few in number, often distinctive and 
experimental in character, and seldom characterized by strong economies of scale. 
Furthermore, space presents formidable managerial challenges, requiring the integration 
of diverse disciplines, the highest standards of product and process technology, and the 
sustenance of such performance over extended periods of time…Pushed by the genie of 
technology on the one hand and pulled by the often perverse logic of politics on the other, 
the world’s space industry waits for a time when significant parts of it can operate as 
normal businesses do. The latter years of the 1980’s were to have been that time, but at 
the end of the decade the space industry may well be much like the government-
dominated entity that now exists.152 
 
Kirton’s analysis of the stresses of the aerospace industry demonstrates in part the heightened 
difficulties present in a network of research and development made up of many different 
complex and disparate entities. Even if the economic capital, managerial organization, and socio-
political support are present in a given endeavor, nothing can be successful without the presence 
and cooperation of scientific and technological objects and network entities. Scientists and 
engineers are dependent on the discovery and growth of new technologies and in many 
circumstances no amount of money or political framing can completely alter the impact of 
scientific discoveries and technological events. John Law argued that “the technologist has to be 
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seen as attempting to build a world where bits and pieces, social, natural, physical, or economic, 
are interrelated and keep each other in place in a hostile and dissociating world.” 153 Big science 
networks like that which formed Hubble struggle to mediate and translate scientific objects with 
the realities of socio-economic, political, and cultural forces. Law argues that “the social and the 
natural are subject to continuous reworking” and therefore should not be used as the primary 
explanation for other “events or processes.” In this way he argues that technological change is 
“best seen as a function of heterogeneous engineering in which systems containing both the 
social and the technological are constructed in a context of conflict with other actors, both 
natural and social.”154 The successes and failures of the shuttle program and the Hubble Space 
Telescope are examples of the power of technological objects to directly impact the people, 
agencies, and other technological objects within and external to their vast networks of 
development.  
The lack of federal stimulus for civil space science has put ever more pressure on large 
scientific programs like Hubble to prove their worth to entities which would provide funding. As 
the United States moves farther away from the prestige-driven space program of the past that 
conflated military and scientifically driven projects, large-scale civil science projects like Hubble 
become increasingly less likely to receive adequate funding or support in the absence of broader 
cultural prioritization of science and technology. Historian Audra Wolfe asks 
What will become of those areas of science, like astronomy or high-energy physics that 
lack reasonable prospects for market exploitation...? Since the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, some university researchers have once again turned to the defense 
establishment, but, as with SDI, the greatest portion of recent military R&D funds have 
flowed directly into the coffers of defense contractors rather than into university 
infrastructure.155 
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The future of big federally funded science programs like Hubble remain ambiguous and 
politically unstable. Hubble’s successor, the James Webb Space Telescope, is one of the NASA’s 
last remaining big science programs. Scientifically ambitious, the James Webb Space Telescope 
is also over budget, behind schedule, and it was narrowly saved from cancellation in 2011 amidst 
further NASA budget cuts.  
Hubble and the data it produced may be incredibly valuable scientifically, intellectually, 
and culturally, but it does not approach the economic or political value of other more tangible 
technological products, such as the sale of fighter jets or the development of rocket propulsion 
systems. Although the political and economic justification for space science may be in a 
weakened state, a significant portion of the public still seem to harbor hope for the civil space 
program in spite of its perceived failures. A New York Times article written at the end of the 
space shuttle program addressed the future of NASA: 
Hubble is alone now with the stars, its vision as peerless as designed. But America still 
has no vision at all for its space program, no plan for where to go next or how…I can’t 
blame NASA for that. NASA works for the president, and the president can do only what 
Congress will give him or her the money for. And Congress answers to the people — that 
is to say, its campaign contributors. They’ve all just been doing what they think they have 
to do, but an astronomer I know who grew up with the same science fiction dreams and 
expectations as I did once described himself as a member of the “cheated generation.”156 
 
Hubble’s deployment was posed at a point in time in which it was able to gain the benefits and 
navigate the drawbacks of federally funded space science during the Cold War, while embodying 
the movement away from risky military and prestige-driven space science. As a successful 
example of large unmanned government funded space science which earned “space spectacular” 
levels of public engagement, Hubble was in some ways the first program of its kind. In the 
absence of the socio-political impetus and cultural priorities characteristic of the space race, the 
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future of large-scale civilian science programs like Hubble remain precarious as does the 
structure of the American space program. 
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